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"Daubert is confined to the evaluation of
'scientific' expert testimony." 1
"Daubert '.S' holding applies to all expert
testimony. " 2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Being a "jack-of-all-trades" in today's world is not easy. Even the
most ambitious students have no background in certain branches of
knowledge. For instance, how many people know why vocal cord
polyps may result from chronic irritation caused by fumes from hot-melt
glue?3 How many can answer whether, in the case of loan participation
agreements, it is the industry-wide standard to incorporate minority
participant veto powers over loan forgiveness arrangements?4 How

1. McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1997).
2. Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1143 n.8 (9th Cir.
1997).
3. See McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995) (involving
expert testimony on this subject).
4. See Den Norske Bank AS v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 75 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.
1996) (involving expert testimony on this subject).
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many can explain why heat may cause a plane engine damper to
polymerize?5
Whether the trier of fact be a judge or jury, the trier needs assistance
from experts on how to answer these questions. Not surprisingly, given
the growing complexity of the mechanics of society, expert witness
testimony is becoming more and more prevalent in our courts. 6 At the
same time, commentators have become more aware of the strong
impression experts have on juries. 7 Juries have been accused of
attributing a "mystic infallibility" 8 and "aura of special reliability" 9 to
opinion evidence. Because eexperts are used so often and are vitally
important to a jury's fact-finding process, it should come as no surprise

5. See Vadala v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 44 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1995) (involving
expert testimony on this subject).
6. See Charles R. Richey, Proposals to Eliminate the Prejudicial Effect of the Use
of the Word "Expert" Under the Federal Rules of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Jury
Trials, 154 F.R.D. 537, 540 (1994) (detailing the rise in expert testimony). As of
September 1996, Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys, who advertise themselves
as North America's largest and most experienced referral service, had more than 24,000
experts under contract worldwide, encompassing 6000 disciplines. Technical Service for
Attorneys, Brochure (on file with author). To get a further grasp of the prevalence of
expert witnesses, observe the February 1998 issue of the American Bar Association
Journal. Of the 187 classified advertisements in this issue, 140 were seeking opinion
witness work involving 64 specialized fields. AB.A. J., Feb. 1998, classified section.
Although there have been few concrete reports on the likelihood that an expert will
testify in any civil or criminal trial, a survey performed by Professor Samuel R. Gross
of the University of Michigan School of Law is illustrative. See Samuel R. Gross,
Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119. Of the 529 civil trials that led to jury
verdicts in California State Superior Court in 1985 and 1986, experts testified at 86%
of these trials. Id. While Professor Gross performed no similar survey on criminal
trials, he relied on other sources to conclude that experts are used in a sizable minority
of felony prosecutions. Id.
7. The strong influence experts have on juries was evidenced in a nationwide poll
of jurors in civil and criminal cases conducted by the National Law Journal and LEXIS.
Expert Witnesses Found Credible by Most Jurors, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 22, 1993, at S4.
Experts appeared in 60% of the cases, and 89% of the jurors found the testimony of the
experts to be very or somewhat believable. Id. A staggering 71 % of the respondents
claimed that the experts made a difference in the verdict. Id. According to the National
Law Journal, the advice trial lawyers could glean from the poll was simple: If you have
the resources, hire an expert. Id.
8. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
9. Richey, supra note 6, at 541. To curb this aura of special reliability, Judge
Richey has argued that the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence should
delete any reference to "expert witness" in Article VIL Id. Judge Richey proposes that
all such testimony be referred to as "opinion testimony" and that so-called experts should
be referred to as "opinion witnesses." Id.
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that courts and commentators have begun to pay greater attention to the
expert testimony that is admitted into trials.
Beginning primarily with the 1993 U.S. Supreme Court decision of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 10 law libraries around
the country have been flooded with articles analyzing the standard for
the admissibility of expert testimony. The flood points not only to the
importance of this issue, but also to the inference that Daubert left many
questions unanswered. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the
few specific guidelines announced by the Court do not begin to cover
the issues that judges who follow Daubert must consider. 11
Much of what has been written about expert testimony in the federal
court system has focused on scientific expert testimony, which was the
type of testimony the Court was faced with in Daubert. 12 Recently,
however, some members of the legal community have turned their
attention to nonscientific expert testimony; a topic not specifically
addressed by the Court. 13 One of the main questions surfacing from
this attention is whether courts should insist that nonscientific experts
have a reliable 14 basis for their opinions. 15 If so, what standard should
the courts use to determine reliability? If courts do have different

10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
11. E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, ls Science a Special Case? The Admissibility
of Scientific Evidence after Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1779, 1780 (1995).
Dreyfuss discusses the Court's failure to explain why science requires special treatment,
as well as the Court's failure to articulate a coherent vision of the role that science and
scientists should play in adjudication.
12. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8 (limiting its holding to the scientific context).
13. See, e.g., Alice Barns Herrington & Steven Michael Crawford, Life Post
Daubert: How is Technical and Specialized Knowledge Affected?, KY BENCH & B.,
Summer 1995; Lisa M. Agrimonti, Comment, The Limitations of Daubert and its
Misapplication to Quasi-Scientific Experts, a Two-Year Case Review of Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), 35 WASHBURN L.J. 134
(1995); Larry E. Coben, The Daubert Decision: Gatekeeper or Executioner?, TRIAL,
Aug. 1996, at 53; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a
Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert
Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2271 (1994). Imwinkelried states that his article
represents "an initial, tentative step toward the development of standards for validating
nonscientific opinions." Imwinkelried, supra, at 2294.
14. The words "reliability" and "validity" will appear many times in this Comment,
although not interchangeably. As Daubert explained, validity refers to the issue of
whether a principle supports what it purports to show (is it in fact accurate), and
reliability refers to whether the application of the principle produces consistent results.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. Put another way, reliability goes to the question of
whether the witness can be believed, while validity goes to the question of whether what
the witness believes is actually true. See Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 1790 n.63.
15. See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential
Dilemma, and Its Progeny, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939, 968 (1996) (arguing that
Daubert's gatekeeping role applies to all experts, regardless of whether their expertise
relates to scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge).
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standards for the admissibility of scientific and nonscientific testimony,
what is it that makes testimony scientific?
A review of the circuit courts reveals that some circuits differ in their
interpretation of Daubert's application to nonscientific testimony. 16
Some circuits have even been inconsistent in their own interpretation of
Daubert's application to nonscientific testimony. 17 For those courts
who have different admissibility standards for scientific and nonscientific
testimony, it is important that they establish a standard for what it is that
makes testimony "scientific." Failure to accomplish this will lead to
inconsistent outcomes and loss of public confidence in the judicial
system. Courts seeking to differentiate the scientific from the nonscientific would be well served by focusing on Daubert's discussion of the
scientific method. From this discussion, a court could conclude that
only opinion evidence derived from knowledge acquired through the
scientific method is scientific.
Despite the variation in the circuits' interpretations of Daubert, this
Comment argues that, as a precondition to admissibility, district court
judges should require that all expert testimony be derived from a reliable
basis. This requirement should exist regardless of whether the expertise
is of a scientific, technical, or in some other way specialized nature.
Support for this requirement can be found in the text of Daubert,
principles of evidence law, and public policy.
The Comment then
offers a model for what steps a federal court could take in determining
the admissibility of any type of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The model is entirely consistent with the
language of Daubert. It breaks a court's analysis down into Rule 702's
three primary requirements: that the expert be qualified, that testimony
assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue, and that
the evidence be reliable. 18 The reliability requirement is the most
intricate of the three, primarily because Daubert's standard for assessing
reliability is ineffective when applied to nonscientific testimony. From
an epistemological 19 perspective, the Daubert standard fails to account

16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra notes 82, 83, and 90.
18. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
19. Epistemology is the study of the method and grounds of knowledge, especially
with reference to its limits and validity. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY .765 (1986).
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for how a nonscientific expert acquires the knowledge underlying his
opinions.
Because of Daubert's inadequacy in this regard, courts must demand
that experts be specific in setting forth what bases they have for their
opm10ns. By discerning the epistemological source of the experts'
knowledge, courts will be better equipped to analyze the reliability of the
experts' opinions. If the knowledge underlying an expert's opinions was
derived from the scientific method, courts should apply a different
reliability analysis than if the knowledge underlying an expert's opinions
was derived from the more common experiences shaping daily life.
With regard to all expert testimony, courts should not only consider the
reliability of the underlying methodology upon which the opinions are
based, but also how that methodology is executed in the case at hand,
as well as the scope and viability of the expert's conclusions. 20
The substance of an expert's testimony is often complex, or the expert
would not have been needed in the first place. Judges are faced with a
very difficult task in screening expert testimony from their courtrooms.
The model proposed in this Comment is only a humble attempt to guide
a court in its approach to a proffer of expert testimony. Admittedly, the
model ignores many of the subtleties which might affect a court's
judgment. Few proffers of expert testimony are suited for a checklist.
The goal of the model, as well. as the entire Comment, is to ease a
court's task in determining the admissibility of expert testimony, not to
complicate it.
II.

FRYE, RULE 702, AND DAUBERT

It seems a matter of common sense that the only expert testimony
society should want in its courtrooms is that which steers the factfinder
towards reaching a more informed verdict. While scholars have long
debated the goals of the legal system, 21 almost all would agree that
having the factfinder reach an informed verdict is among them. The

20. See Jay P. Kesan, Note, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert
World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985 (1996). Kesan's suggested analysis for how courts might
handle scientific expert testimony resembles the analysis adopted by the model.
21. Simon H. Rifkind, a well-known scholar and former judge for the Southern
District of New York, has remarked, "[T]he object of trial is not the ascertainment of
truth but the resolution of a controversy by the principled application of the rules of the
game. In a civilized society those rules should be designed to favor the just resolution
of a controversy ...." 2 SIMON H. RIFKIND, The Lawyer's Role and Responsibility in
Modern Society, in ONE MAN'S WORLD, 515, 527 (1986). For more reading on the
object of a trial, see MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980), and Robert C.
Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a Dark Glass, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 379 (1987).
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Federal Rules of Evidence actually purport to pursue an even loftier
goal, stating that the rules should be construed to secure promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 22 If an expert
has no reasonable basis for his opinions, this shortcoming increases the
possibility that the jury will deliver an uninformed verdict and that
justice will not be served. 23 No principle of fairness demands that the
adversary system allow parties to spread untruths in a courtroom. 24

22. FED. R. Evrn. 102.
23. See Richard D. Friedman, The Death and Transfiguration of Frye, 34
JURIMETRICS J. 133, 134 (1994). Friedman discusses what would happen if expert
testimony is in fact worthless, or of far less value than the factfinder is likely to attribute
to it. Id. In such a circumstance, "allowing the factfinder to hear and use the evidence
may actually lead them further away from the truth." Id. at 135.
24. Some might argue that cross-examination should satisfactorily expose
unreliable expert testimony and that courts need not play a vigilant screening role. See,
e.g., Newell P.R., Ltd. v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 20 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1994). According
to the Newell Puerto Rico court, "[t]he fact that an expert's testimony may be tentative
or even speculative does not mean that the testimony must be excluded so long as
opposing counsel has an opportunity to attack the expert's credibility." Id. (quoting Int'l.
Adhesive Coating Co. v. Bolton Emerson Int'l., Inc., 851 F.2d 540, 544 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Daubert also makes a pitch for the importance of cross-examination. See Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). In response to the respondent's
apprehension that abandonment of general acceptance would result in a "free-for-all" of
irrational pseudoscientific assertions, the Daubert court claimed that vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
testimony. Id. Notwithstanding this dicta, one must remember that Daubert held that
the reasoning or methodology underlying testimony of a scientific nature must be
scientifically valid. Id. at 592-93. The Court's discussion of cross-examination in no
way detracted from its emphasis on reliability.
The problem with relying on cross-examination to weed out unreliable expert
testimony is that, under some circumstances, the tactic may not be successful. Even
though the adversary system rests on the notion that competing attorneys will be roughly
equivalent in quality and possess a similar level of resources to pursue litigation, this
premise· does not always hold true. For instance, the plaintiffs in a product liability case
will, by-and-large, have fewer resources to devote to the case than a large, corporate
defendant will. See Cohen, supra note 13, at 53 (discussing same). Similarly, a criminal
defendant often has fewer resources than the government. See Margaret A. Berger,
Procedural Paradigms for Applying the Daubert Test, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1345, 1352-53
(1994). As a result, certain parties may be unable to hire their own comparably skilled
expert, regardless of whether the facts are in their favor. Even if these parties can
employ a comparably skilled expert, that expert may be financially constrained in terms
of doing the research necessary for his testimony.
Another worry is that attorneys will be unable to expose the weakness in the opposing
party's expert's opinions. Professional experts, whose income depends on their
consistent effectiveness, know how to conduct themselves when under examination. As
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Perhaps in recognition of the kind of argument made above, constraints on the admissibility of expert testimony are rooted in the
traditions of American law. 25 The standards for when to exclude expert
testimony have differed over time and between jurisdictions. In federal
court and in many states, 26 the standard for most of this century with
regard to scientific testimony was "general acceptance." 27 Under Frye
v. Unites States, a decision by the Federal Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, scientific evidence was admissible only if the
principle upon which it was based was sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in its field. 28 Most courts following Frye
refused to extend the same standard to nonscientific expert testimony. 29

Stephen Paris, President of the Defense Research Institute, has observed, "[T]his is not
'Perry Mason.' You never see an expert break down in tears and say, 'You're right.
You're right. I'm wrong.' They are poised, articulate advocates." Expert Witnesses
Found Credible by Most Jurors, supra note 7, at S4 (quoting Mr. Paris).
This concern that cross-examination may at times be inadequate to expose the truth
was also recently voiced by the Fifth Circuit. See Guillory v. Domtar Indus., Inc., 95
F.3d 1320, 1331 (5th Cir. 1996). In Guillory, the plaintiff, who was injured in a forklift
accident, offered the expert testimony of Dr. Walter Reed, a mechanical engineer and
accident reconstruction expert. Id. at 1329. Dr. Reed's opinions rested in large part on
a model he had created of the forklift involved in the accident. Id. at 1331. The court
excluded Dr. Reed's testimony on the ground that the model was unreliable. Id.
According to the court, "[w]e are convinced that cross-examination of Dr. Reed could
not salvage the truth.... The jury, frantically grasping at complex forklift and mining
concepts, could easily miss subtle distinctions revealed on cross-examination and then
drown in the untrue and the unproven." Id.
.
25. See PETER w. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 14 (1991) (discussing this trend).
26. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2272.
27. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the
defendant was subjected to a systolic blood pressure deception test, which was a
precursor to the modem polygraph or "lie detector" test. The defendant's attorney
offered as an expert the scientist who conducted the tests to testify as to the results. The
district court sustained the prosecutor's objection. In affirming the district court's
decision, the Federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that "the
systolic blood-pressure deception test has not yet .gained such standing and scientific
recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would justify the courts
in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments
thus far made." Id. The court further stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from
a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. (emphasis added). This passage became the primary authority for the "general
acceptance" test.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978)
(interpreting Frye to support this proposition).
29. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2280.
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Instead, these courts adopted a laissez-faire attitude for when and under
what criteria they would admit nonscientific testimony. 30
In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
included provisions specific to the admissibility of opinion testimony.
Rule 702, which is at the focus of this Comment, reads, "If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."31
In scanning this statute, one will discover that there is no mention of
general acceptance. The Advisory Committee notes make no mention
of it either.
Had Frye been eclipsed by the Federal Rules of Evidence? The Third
Circuit tackled this question in the 1985 case of United States v.
Downing, 32 and the opinion it delivered became a cornerstone for later
treatment of scientific expert testimony by other circuits, as well as the
U.S. Supreme Court. 33 In Downing, the Third Circuit was confronted
with the issue of whether to admit the testimony of an expert in the field
of human perception and memory concerning the reliability of eyewitness identifications. 34 While Downing recognized that the status of the
Frye test under Rule 702 was somewhat uncertain, it rejected the test for
reasons of "policy."35 After expounding on Frye's flaws, Downing set

30. Id.
31. FED R. Evrn. 702.
32. 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir. 1985).
33. The Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. relied upon
Downing for the proposition that all scientific expert testimony must be relevant. 509
U.S. 579, 591 (1993). The Court further cited Downing for the proposition that a
reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identification of
a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a particular degree of
acceptance within the community. Id. Daubert also stated in a footnote that its general
discussion of reliability drew in part on Downing. Id. at 594 n.12.
34. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1226.
35. Id. at 1232. According to the court, the primary justification for the Frye test
was that it provided a single method by which courts could assess the reliability of novel
scientific expert testimony. Id. at 1235. No weighing of factors was involved. On the
other hand, the court believed that the Frye test was too malleable to provide for orderly
and uniform decision-making. Id. at 1237. Courts could too easily manipulate the
relevant scientific community and the level of agreement needed for acceptance. Id. at
1236. Furthermore, the general acceptance standard reflected a conservative approach
to the admissibility of scientific evidence which was at odds with the liberal spirit and
language of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 1237. As the court pointed out, some
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forth a flexible approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence that
was consistent with the language of Rule 702. 36 Downing stated that,
in a district court judge's preliminary inquiry into the admissibility of
scientific evidence, the judge must consider the evidence's reliability,
potential for prejudice, and relevancy. 37 The court then listed some of
the factors bearing on reliability, one of which could be general
acceptance. 38
With courts beginning to eschew Frye and turn to Downing-like
standards whose emphasis was on evidentiary reliability, or worse, turn
to no standard at all, the discordance impelled commentators to take a
closer look at how the legal system dealt with expert testimony. Many
of these commentators expressed displeasure, some even going so far as
to suggest that the state of expert testimony was an outright disgrace. 39
One of the leading spokespeople for this position was Peter Huber, who
expressed disgust at some courts' growing willingness to tolerate
quackery on the witness stand and the peddling of "junk science." 40
According to Huber, the legal establishment had adjusted the rules of

scientific evidence may be able to assist the trier of fact even though the principles
underlying the evidence had not become generally accepted in the field to which they
belong. Id. at 1235. The notion here seems to be that the Frye test may exclude the
expert testimony of a scientist with a brilliant, new theory, but whose theory had not yet
received sufficient exposure in the scientific community to have gained general
acceptance.
For more insight into the advantages and disadvantages of Frye, see Paul C. Giannelli,
The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM L. REV. 1197 (1980); Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining
a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879 (1982); and Andre A.
Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 545 (1984).
36. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1238.
39. See Gross, supra note 6, at 1116. Gross offers this bleak thumbnail sketch of
using expert information in American courts:
[T]he lawyers on each side of a dispute, acting in secret, choose people from
an almost indefinitely large array and designate them as the witnesses; these
witnesses are paid handsomely for their testimony; lawyers can preemptively
hire witnesses in order to keep them from testifying when their honest
testimony might help the other side; many witnesses make a business of
testifying, and advertising their services; the attorneys control the information
and the issues on which their experts testify; witnesses are allowed to testify
to matters beyond their personal knowledge and to evaluate, as well as, [sic]
to present information; the existing rules of pre-trial discovery are curtailed so
that the identity and the evidence of many potential witnesses can be
concealed from the opposing party; the usual rules of evidence are inapplicable
at trial; and, finally, the subject matter of the testimony by these witnesses is
intrinsically confusing, if not incomprehensible, to judges and jurors.
Id. at 1125.
40. HUBER, supra note 25, at 3.
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evidence so that "almost any self-styled scientist, no matter how strange
or iconoclastic his views, will be welcome to testify in court. The same
scientific questions are litigated again and again, in one courtroom after
the next, so that error is almost inevitable." 41
It was against this backdrop that on June 29, 1993, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Jnc. 42 In Daubert, the petitioners were two minor children who had
been born with serious birth defects. 43 The children and their parents
sued respondent Merrell Dow, alleging that the birth defects had been
caused by the mothers' ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea
drug marketed by Merrell Dow. 44 In proving causation, the petitioners
relied on eight experts, each of whom had impressive credentials. 45
These experts concluded that, based on a variety of methodologies, none
of which had been generally accepted in their respective fields,
Bendectin does cause birth defects in humans. 46 In granting summary
judgment to the respondent, the district court held that the petitioner's
expert testimony was inadmissible because it failed the Frye test. 47 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 48
Justice Blackmun, the author of the Supreme Court's majority opinion
in Daubert, divided the opinion into two essential parts. The first part,
supported by a unanimous court, held that the Frye test had been
superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Drawing upon much of
the logic and authority utilized by the Downing court, Justice Blackmun
concluded that having general acceptance as the exclusive test for
admissibility was incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence. 49

41. Id. As one of Huber's numerous and extraordinary examples of the "let-it-allin" approach to expert testimony, Huber describes how one mother successfully
attributed her son's cerebral palsy to trauma caused by her fall at work shortly before
his birth. Id. at 77. In another case, a soothsayer with the backing of expert testimony
from a doctor and several police department officials persuaded a Philadelphia jury that
she had lost her psychic powers following a CAT scan. Id. at 4. The trial judge
eventually threw out the jury's $1 million damage award. Id.
42. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
43. Id. at 582.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 583.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 584.
49. Id. at 589.
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In the second part of the opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Stevens declined to join, the Court began by interpreting Rule
702. According to Justice Blackmun, when a trial judge is faced with
the proffer of expert testimony, he must determine at the outset whether
the expert is proposing to testify to (1) "scientific knowledge" that (2)
will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. 50
This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or
methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether the reasoning or methodology can properly be applied to the
facts in issue. 51
The Court then proposed four factors, which it described as "general
observations," that should be weighed in a flexible manner by the trial
judge in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact. 52 The first factor a trial
judge should consider is whether the theory or technique can be or has
been tested. Testing a hypothesis, claimed the Court, distinguishes
science from other fields of human inquiry. 53 The second factor to be
considered is whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication. While not a sine qua non of admissibility, peer
review and publication increase the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected. 54 Third, in the case of a particular
scientific technique, the trial judge should consider the known or
potential rate of error, as well as the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation. 55 Logic suggests that
a technique with a high rate of error or weak standards in controlling its
operation will be less reliable. Finally, the trial judge should consider
"general acceptance." Widespread acceptance of a technique or theory
may recommend its admissibility, while minimal support may encourage
a trial judge to view the technique or theory with skepticism. 56
The Court emphasized that the focus of the inquiry envisioned by Rule
702 must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. 57 In addition to Rule 702, a trial judge should
be mindful of other applicable rules governing the admissibility of expert

50. Id. at 590-91. The first requirement goes primarily to reliability and the
second goes primarily to relevance. Id.
51. Id. at 592-93.
52. Id. at 593-94.
53. Id. at 593. The Court described testability as a "key question," perhaps
suggesting that of the four factors, it was the most important. See id.
54. Id. at 593-94.
55. Id. at 594.
56. Id.
51. Id. at 594-95.
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testimony. 58 Among those noted by the Court were Rules 703, 59
706, 60 and 403. 61 Justice Blackmun closed his opinion by contrasting
the quests for truth in the courtroom with the quests for truth in the
laboratory. 62 While s,cientific conclusions are subject to perpetual
revision, law must resolve disputes finally and quickly. 63
III.

DAUBERT'S SCOPE: THE DEBATE

One of the immediate sources of disagreement resulting from Daubert,
and an area that sparks just as much controversy today, is the opinion's
scope. 64 Particularly, courts and commentators are divided as to
whether the opinion was limited to scientific testimony or whether it was

58. Id. at 595.
59. Rule 703 provides that expert opinions may be based on otherwise inadmissible
hearsay, but are to be admitted only if the facts or data upon which the opinions are
based are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences on the subject. FED. R. Evrn. 703. In the same way that Daubert
gave Rule 703 short shrift in prescribing its impact on the admissibility of expert
evidence, so will this Comment.
60. Rule 706 allows a trial judge to appoint an expert of his own choosing. FED.
R. Evid. 706. Having courts appoint independent experts is thought by some to be a
way to overcome the "battle of the experts" which is now so common. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES: TEXT,
CASES, AND PROBLEMS 715 (3d ed. 1996). Nevertheless, court-appointed experts are a
rarity in American practice. Id. A likely explanation for this rarity is that judges are
reluctant to interfere in the parties' presentation of evidence. Id. Such interference may
strike a judge as counter to our country's adversary tradition. Id.
61. Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury. FED. R. Evrn. 403. In Daubert, the Court, quoting Judge Jack
Weinstein, explained, "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading
because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing
possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises
more control than over experts than over lay witnesses." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595
(quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence ls Sound: It
Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)). Although courts do make use
of Rule 403 to exclude expert testimony, the focal point of this Comment is Rule 702,
which more frequently governs a court's admissibility analysis.
62. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
63. Id. at 597.
64. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 1782 ("The question of scope was
apparent even before the majority's ink was dry.").
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also meant to encompass nonscientific testimony. 65 If it was meant to
encompass nonscientific testimony, to what extent?
A.

The Four Broad Options Which Courts Tend to Embrace

Courts have essentially chosen between four broad options in
identifying Daubert's scope. Under the first option, courts have decided
that Daubert is completely inapplicable to nonscientific expert testimony,66 even for the simple proposition that Rule 702 regulates the subject
and theories about which a nonscientific expert may testify. 67 Under
the second option, courts still do not extend Daubert's standard for
admissibility to nonscientific testimony, although they do read Rule 702
as the governing rule for the subject and theories about which a
nonscientific expert may testify. Courts adopting either the first or
second option may not mention Daubert in their analysis, although it is
fair to infer that all federal judges are familiar with Daubert and at least
bear the case in mind whenever they are confronted with expert
testimony. A third option is to cite Daubert for the proposition that
nonscientific testimony must be reliable and relevant to the task at hand.
The fourth major option is to extend Daubert not only to the proposition
that nonscientific testimony must be reliable and relevant, but also that
the testimony satisfy Daubert's test for reliability. This would require
a court to consider whether the evidence is valid in light of the Daubert
factors.
An example of a court choosing the first option, that Daubert is
inapplicable to nonscientific testimony even for the proposition that Rule
702 regulates the subjects and theories about which a nonscientific
expert may testify, is the Second Circuit case of Iacobelli Construction,

65. See, e.g., Richard Nahas, Comment, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. Requiem for Frye: The Supreme Court Lays to Rest the Common Law Standard for
Admitting Scientific Evidence in the Federal Courts, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 93, 126-27
(1994) (observing that if courts were to hold that Daubert's dicta was limited to the area
of scientific evidence, they would have to address a series of related questions which
Daubert offers no guidance in resolving). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his partial dissent
in Daubert, anticipated these interpretive problems. He asked, "Does all this dicta [in
the second part of the Court's opinion] apply to an expert seeking to testify on the basis
of 'technical or other specialized knowledge' -the other types of expert knowledge to
which Rule 702 applies-or are the 'general observations' limited only to 'scientific
knowledge'?" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part).
66. See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of what makes testimony "scientific" or
"nonscientific."
67. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 ("The primary locus of this obligation [to screen
scientific evidence] is Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some degree of regulation
of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.").
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Inc. v. County of Monroe. 68 Iacobelli, a public contractor, brought suit
against the county, the water district, and the project engineer as a result
of their denial of Iacobelli's differing site conditions claim under a
contract to construct a sewage tunnel. 69 Relying on Daubert, the
district court disregarded the affidavits of the plaintiff's experts, whose
testimony on the contract and construction results were derived from
review of bid documents, geotechnical data, and geotechnical interpretive
reports. 70 The Second Circuit reversed, stating that the experts'

68. 32 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994). The Second Circuit also followed this approach in
a case involving the expert testimony of an accountant who testified on behalf of the
plaintiff regarding payroll records. See Tamarin v. Adams Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51,
53 (1993). In Tamarin, the court held that Daubert dealt specifically with scientific
evidence, and therefore the plaintiff was under no burden to establish the credentials of
his expert accountant. Id. The Second Circuit did not mention Rule 702 at all in its
brief analysis. See id.
The Tenth Circuit adhered to this first option in a wrongful termination case in which
the plaintiffs expert was testifying as to the plaintiff's lost wages. See Gomez v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1995). The trial court had admitted
the expert's testimony over defendant's objections that the evidence was purely
speculative. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that "[a]lthough an expert opinion must
be based on 'facts which enable [her] to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as
opposed to conjecture or speculation, ... absolute certainty is not required."' Id. at 1519
(quoting Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 662 (11th Cir. 1988)). After setting
forth this Rule 703-like standard, the court held that the weaknesses in the data upon
which the plaintiffs expert relied properly went to the weight the jury should have given
her opinions; they did not render her testimony too speculative as a matter of law. Id.
Nowhere did the court mention Rule 702.
The Seventh Circuit appeared to follow this approach in the case of an expert witness
who would have testified in a criminal trial that certain of the government's witnesses
had engaged in illegal conduct of their own. See United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753,
757 (7th Cir. 1996). The district court had excluded the testimony under Rule 403. Id.
Sinclair essentially argued on appeal that Daubert relieved trial courts of having to
perform any Rule 403 analysis. Id. The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, holding
that:
Daubert does not create a special analysis for answering questions about the
admissibility of all expert testimony. Instead, it provides a method for
evaluating the reliability of witnesses who claim scientific expertise. Daubert,
therefore has no direct relevance to questions about the admissibility of
testimony by a witness who claims legal expertise.
Id. (footnote omitted). While it is true that the court was not confronted with the issue
of the expert's reliability, the court's blanket statement that Daubert was inapplicable to
the type of testimony in question suggests that the court would not look specifically to
Daubert for the proposition that Rule 702 regulates the subjects and theories about which
a nonscientific expert may testify, or for the proposition that all nonscientific testimony
must be reliable and relevant.
69. Iacobelli Constr., Inc., 32 F.3d at 21-22.
70. Id. at 24-25.
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affidavits did not present the kind of "junk science" problem that
Daubert was meant to address. 71 Because the experts relied upon the
type of methodology and data typically used and accepted in construction litigation cases, the affidavits should have been admissible. 72 As
is evident, the Iacobelli court did not base its admissibility analysis on
the language of Rule 702. Instead, the court relied on a standard for
admissibility that was more closely akin to Rule 703. 73
An example of a court choosing the second broad category, that under
Daubert Rule 702 regulates the subject and theories about which a
nonscientific expert may testify, is the Ninth Circuit case of Thomas v.
Newton International Enterprises. 74 Thomas was a longshore worker
who was injured when she fell through an unguarded, uncovered hatch
opening. 75 Thomas filed a negligence action in California state court
against the vessel owner, Newton International, which Newton subsequently removed to federal court. During the summary judgment
hearing, Thomas sought to introduce the declaration of George Kuvakas,
Jr., a longshoreman with twenty-nine years of experience. 76 After
reviewing all of the subpoenaed documents from Newton and photographs of the accident site, Kuvakas declared that in his experience the
presence of an unguarded, uncovered deck opening or manhole
positioned within two feet of the bottom of an access ladder is an
extremely unusual and hazardous condition. 77 The district court refused
to consider Kuvakas's declaration, in part on the ground that an
inadequate foundation was provided for his qualifications. Subsequently,
the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.78
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Kuvakas was qualified to give
expert testimony and that his testimony created a genuine issue of
material fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. 79
According to the court, the issue of qualifications is governed by Rule
702, under which an expert may be qualified by either "knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education." 80 Based on Kuvakas's years of

71. Id. at 25.
72. Id.
73. See supra note 59 (discussing Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
74. 42 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 1994).
75. Id. at 1268.
76. Id. at 1269. In his declaration, Kuvakas declared that he had worked in every
job category within the industry and for every stevedoring company. Id.
77. Id. Kuvakas also declared that this type of condition would not be something
that even an experienced longshore worker would anticipate. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1269-70.
80. Id. at 1269 (quoting FED. R. Evm. 702).
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longshore experience and the variety of work he had performed, the
court found that this at least lay the minimal foundation of knowledge,
skill, and experience required in order to satisfy Rule 702. 81 In a
footnote, the court stated that "Daubert was clearly confined to the
evaluation of scientific expert testimony." 82 The court performed no
inquiry into the reliability of Kuvakas's opinions, nor did it attempt to
apply any of the Daubert factors. Overall, it appears that the court's
admissibility test began and ended with a reading of Rule 702 that
required that a nonscientific expert be sufficiently qualified in the
pertinent field.
The third option, that application of the Daubert factors is unwarranted
with nonscientific testimony, but that Daubert still requires all expert
testimony to be reliable and relevant, is embraced by many courts. 83

81. Id. at 1269-70.
82. Id. at 1270 n.3. As is discussed infra Part IV.A, the Ninth Circuit has
struggled to find a consistent interpretation of Daubert in relation to nonscientific expert
testimony. Compare United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997)
("Daubert applies only to the admission of scientific testimony.") and McKendall v.
Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Daubert is confined to the
evaluation of 'scientific' expert testimony."), with Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed
Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1143 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Daubert's holding applies to all expert
testimony.") and Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 501 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Daubert's requirements "apply to all proffered testimony-not just testimony based on
novel scientific methods or evidence."). For now the McKendall court has the final
word on the matter.
83. The Fourth Circuit has recently followed this approach. See Freeman v. Case
Corp., 118 F.3d 1011, 1016-17 (4th Cir. 1997). In Freeman, plaintiff offered the expert
testimony of Smith Reed, an expert in mechanical engineering, to prove design defect.
Id. at 1016. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to admit Reed's
testimony, reasoning that in cases where an expert relies on his experience and training
and not a particular methodology to reach his conclusions, application of the Daubert
analysis is unwarranted. Id. at 1016 n.6. Although the court did not cite Daubert for
the proposition that all expert testimony must be reliable, the court did perform a
reliability analysis. See id at 1016-17.
Freeman purported to leave "open" whether Daubert applies outside the scientific
context, yet stated that Daubert did not apply where an expert relies on experience and
training to form his opinions. Id. at 1016 n.6. As discussed infra note 167, the Fourth
Circuit's explanation as to why Daubert did not apply under the facts of Freeman
demonstrates the court's difficulty in apprehending what makes testimony scientific or
nonscientific, as well as the significance of that distinction.
The Seventh Circuit adopted this third option in a 1993 case involving the expert
testimony of an accountant, although in doing so used some language one might expect
to encounter with a court adopting the fourth option. See Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat
Marwick, 2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993). In Frymire-Brinati, a pair of investors sued Peat
Marwick for securities fraud, alleging that the accounting firm committed fraud in
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An example of a court espousing this third option is the Tenth Circuit
in Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc. 84 Compton brought suit against
Subaru for design defect and sought to introduce the expert testimony of
Larry Bihlmeyer, an aerospace and mechanical engineer. 85 In arriving
at his conclusion that the accident vehicle was defectively designed,
Bihlmeyer relied upon general engineering principles and his twenty-two
years of experience in the industry. 86 In affirming the district court's
decision to admit Bihlmeyer's testimony, the Tenth Circuit cited Daubert

certifying financial statements upon which the investors had relied. Id. at 185-86. The
plaintiffs' expert, a manager of an accounting firm, testified that in conducting the audit
of the financial statements, Peat Marwick did not state its accounts according to
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Id. at 186. The expert, who relied in part
on a controversial discounted cash flow analysis, conceded that he did not employ the
methodology that experts in valuation find essential. Id.
The court held that the expert's testimony should have been excluded, finding that
under Daubert a trial judge must ensure that all expert testimony is reliable and relevant.
Id. The court further cited Daubert for the proposition that the Federal Rules of
Evidence require a judge to undertake a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid. Id. As is evident,
Frymire-Brinati discussed Daubert's standard of reliability-scientific validity-in the
context of a nonscientific field of inquiry. Despite this, the court did not explicitly
subject the expert's testimony to the Daubert factors.
Another example of a court adopting this third option is the Eighth Circuit case of
United States v. Johnson, 28 F.3d 1487, 1496-97 (8th Cir. 1994). In Johnson,
defendants were convicted of conspiring to distribute cocaine base (crack). Id. at 1492.
The government offered the testimony of Keith Johnson, an unindicted coconspirator and
member of the Crenshaw Mafia Bloods gang, who testified generally about the business
of drug trafficking, the Bloods, gang membership, and the association between the
defendants. Id. at 1496. Johnson had extensive experience in the business of drug
trafficking, evidenced by six years of setting up drug distribution centers in different
cities. Id. In upholding the district court's decision to admit Johnson's testimony, the
Eighth Circuit cited Daubert for the proposition that an expert's testimony must rest on
a reliable foundation and be relevant to the task at hand. Id. at 1497. The court's
inquiry into reliability was apparently satisfied by Johnson's experience in drug
trafficking and his personal association with some of the defendants. See id. at 1496-97.
The Eighth Circuit seemed to abandon this third category, however, only two years
after Johnson in Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 293, 296-98 (8th Cir.
1996). In Peitzmeier, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of
plaintiffs' expert testimony regarding design defects in a tire-changing machine. Id. at
298. The court applied all four Daubert factors in its reliability inquiry, rejecting
plaintiffs' argument that Daubert is inapplicable to testimony founded on basic
engineering principles. Id. at 297. Although the Eighth Circuit's apparent inconsistent
application of Daubert may rest in its indecision over what constitutes scientific
testimony, the language of the case seems to suggest that the Daubert factors should be
applied to all expert testimony. See id. at 296 (discussing Daubert in the context of
expert testimony generally). Indeed, at least one other federal circuit court appears to
have read Peitzmeier to this effect. See Watkins v. Telsrnith, 121 F.3d 984, 990 (5th
Cir. 1997).
84. 82 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1996).
85. Id. at 1516.
86. Id. at 1519.
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for the proposition that all expert testimony must be reliable and
relevant, 87 but went on to add that "[t]he language in Daubert makes
clear the factors outlined by the Court are applicable only when a
proffered expert relies on some principle or methodology. In other
words, application of Daubert factors is unwarranted in cases where
expert testimony is based solely upon experience and training." 88
Compton concluded that because Bihlmeyer's testimony was not
dependent on any particular methodology or technique, Daubert had
little bearing. 89
An example of a court adhering to the fourth broad option, that
nonscientific testimony must be valid in light of the Daubert factors, is
the Sixth Circuit case of Berry v. City of Detroit. 90 In Berry, the

87. Id.
88. Id. at 1518.
89. Id. at 1519.
90. 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit appears to have retreated from
this fourth category, however. See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1158 (6th Cir.
1997). In Jones, the Sixth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the testimony of the government's expert witness, a forensic document
analyst. Id. at 1161. The court declined to incorporate the Daubert factors in its
admissibility analysis, reasoning, "If that framework were to be extended to outside the
scientific realm, many types of relevant and reliable expert testimony-that derived
substantially from practical experience-would be excluded." Id. at 1158.
Ironically, the Jones court referred to certain passages of Berry for general support for
its new position regarding Daubert's application to nonscientific testimony. See id.
Once one gets past the apparently inconsistent applications of Daubert, the Jones opinion
provides an excellent analysis of the overlap of the admissibility inquiries regarding a
nonscientific expert's qualifications and the reliability of his testimony. See id. at 115455, 1160; see also infra Part V.A (discussing this overlap). The Jones opinion also
demonstrates how a court might analyze the reliability of a nonscientific expert's
opinions by focusing on the quality and quantity of the experiences shaping his opinions.
See Jones, 107 F.3d at 1160; see also infra Part V.C.2.b.iii.(a)-(b) (discussing this focus
on the quality and quantity of a nonscientific expert's experiences). .
A recent example of a court adhering to this fourth option, although with qualifications, is the Fifth Circuit in Watkins v. Telesmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 988-91 (5th Cir.
1997). In support of her claim for design defect, Watkins offered the expert testimony
of Marcus Dean Williams, who was to testify that the conveyor in question was unsafe
and that alternative designs were feasible. Id. at 986. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's exclusion of the testimony, holding that "the non-exclusive list of factors
relevant under Daubert to assessing scientific methodology . . . are also relevant to
assessing other types of expert evidence. Whether the expert would opine on economic
evaluation, advertising psychology, or engineering, application of the Daubert factors is
germane ...." Id. at 991 (footnotes omitted).
The court qualified its conception of Daubert' s application to nonscientific testimony
by stressing that Watkins involved an application of science to a concrete and practical
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plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after his son was shot to
death by a Detroit police officer. 91 At trial, the plaintiff introduced the
expert testimony of a former police sheriff, Frederick Postill, to establish
that the police department's failure to properly discipline their officers
was the proximate cause of the shooting. 92 Postill's testimony rested
in large part on his review of the police department's past "shots fired"
reports. 93 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of
six million dollars. 94
The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that Postill was not sufficiently
qualified and that his testimony did not meet the requirements of
Daubert. 95 The court stated that although Daubert dealt with scientific
experts, "its language relative to the 'gatekeeper' function of federal
judges is applicable to all expert testimony offered under Rule 702." 96
Therefore, according to the court, the trial judge must ensure that any
and all testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable. 97 The Sixth Circuit performed its perceived gatekeeping
function, in part, by applying three of the four Daubert factors. The
court found that (1) there was no indication of any testing of Postill's
discipline theory, (2) Postill's theories had not been subjected to peer
review, and (3) because there was no evidence that Postill's theories

problem. See id. at 990. The court found "not particularly relevant" the Ninth Circuit's
holding that the Daubert factors are inapplicable to expert testimony based on
specialized knowledge of criminal behavior patterns. Id. at 989 n.5 (referencing United
States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997) and United States v. Webb, 115
F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 1997)). Apparently Watkins would adjust its reliability inquiry
depending on the extent to which the expert testimony in question depended on
principles of science.
As the Watkins court conceded in a footnote, its interpretation of Daubert's application
to nonscientific testimony had evolved somewhat from an earlier decision by that court.
See id. at 990 n.7 (discussing United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less
Situated in Leflore County, State of Mississippi, 80 F.3d 1074 (5th Cir. 1996)). Some
might argue, however, that the Fifth Circuit had done more of an "about face." In I4.38
Acres of Land, an eminent domain action, the Fifth Circuit declined to incorporate the
Daubert factors in its admissibility analysis of the proposed testimony of both an
engineering and a real estate appraisal expert. See 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d at 1078.
The court stated, "Daubert expressly limited its discussion to the admissibility of
scientific expert testimony." Id. at 1078 n.3. Considering Watkins's discussion of the
Ninth Circuit line of cases involving expert testimony based on criminal behavior
patterns, as well as its discussion of 14.38 Acres of Land, one could conclude that the
Fifth Circuit is still groping for a consistent interpretation of Daubert.
91. Berry, 25 F.3d at 1344.
92. Id. at 1348.
93. See id. at 1352.
94. ld. at 1344.
95. Id. at 1349-56.
96. ld. at 1350.
97. Id.
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were accepted by anyone other than himself, there was no evidence of
general acceptance. 98 As is evident, the Berry court believed that the
Daubert factors were an appropriate tool to use in determining the
reliability of nonscientific testimony.
B.

What the Daubert Opinion Itself Reveals as to its Scope

To some extent, the Daubert majority was clear as to the scope of the
opinion. In a footnote, the Court stated that, although Rule 702 applies
to technical and other specialized knowledge, its discussion was limited
to the "scientific context," because that was the nature of the expertise
offered in the case. 99 So, like its predecessor Frye, Daubert left
unanswered what was to be the standard for the admissibility of
nonscientific evidence. 100 Because there is no express reliability
requirement in Rule 702, lower courts are arguably free to admit
unreliable nonscientific testimony. 101
Although Daubert, on its face, permits this freedom, the Court did
imply a reliability requirement. Recall that Daubert grounded its
reliability inquiry in the phrase "scientific knowledge." 102 According
to the Court, "the word 'knowledge' connotes more than subjective
belief or unsupported speculation. The term 'applies to any body of
known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted
as truths on good grounds. "' 103 One would expect that the Court
intended the word "knowledge" to carry the same meaning and weight
whether it be used in the context of scientific, technical, or other

98.
99.
100.
limiting
101.
102.
103.
(1986)).

Id. at 1350-51.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.8. (1993).
See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (implicitly
its discussion to scientific testimony).
See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2288 (expressing this concern).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90.
Id. at 590 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252
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specialized knowledge. 104 All expert testimony, Daubert suggests,
must rest on good grounds.
The Court also hinted at a reliability requirement for nonscientific
testimony when it discussed the differences between the admissibility of
opinion and lay testimony. 105 The Court stated that unlike an ordinary
witness, 106 an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer opinions,
including those not based on firsthand knowledge or observation. 107
The Court continued, "Presumably, this relaxation of the usual requirement of firsthand knowledge ... is premised on an assumption that the
expert's opinions will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and
experience of his discipline." 108 This dicta indicates that the Court
would require that a nonscientific expert's opinions have a reliable basis
in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.
Beyond the language of Daubert, one could infer a reliability
requirement for nonscientific testimony from. the overall tenor of the
opm10n. As one com.m.entator has suggested, Daubert reflects a
continuing mistrust of juries "to sort out the wheat from. the chaff." 109
Evidently, the Court has concluded that judges are generally more
equipped than jurors to determine what credence to lend to an expert's

104. See Pomella v. Regency Coach Lines, Ltd., 899 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Mich.
1995). In Pomella, the plaintiff was injured in a traffic,accident when the car in which
she was a passenger was struck by a bus. Id. at 337. The plaintiff's experts relied upon
estimates of the coefficient of friction in order to compute the time it would have taken
the bus to come to a stop. Id. at 340. In conducting its admissibility inquiry, the court
stated that Rule 702 requires that an expert's opinion relate to scientific knowledge. Id.
at 342. In a footnote, the court added:
Rule 702 likewise speaks to "technical and other specialized knowledge"; [sic]
but the Supreme Court in Daubert focused on "scientific knowledge."
Whether the coefficient of friction data falls under the former or the latter
category, presumably the requirement of evidentiary reliability announced in
Daubert applies. As the word "knowledge" appears in both of the terms . .. ,
it remains true that the expert's opinion must be based on "more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation", [sic] because this is the
connotation of the word "knowledge."
Id. at 342 n.7 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
105. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
106. See FED. R. Evm. 701. Under Rule 701, a lay witness's testimony in the form
of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a)
rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding
of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Id.
107. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. Under Rule 602, a lay witness may not testify to
a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge. FED. R. Evm. 602.
108. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
109. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 144.
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testimony. 110 This stands to reason. Judges are more educated than
the average juror and more experienced in making courtroom credibility
determinations. Furthermore, judges are able to ask experts questions
directly, while juries generally rely-on the attorneys to elicit information
bearing on the experts' credibility.
C.

Other Considerations for Requiring That all Expert Testimony
Has a Reliable Foundation

Federal courts regularly exclude evidence that they suspect might be
unreliable. Examples of this evidence include hearsay, 111unauthenticated documents, 112 unoriginal writings, recordings and photographs, 113 and lay witnesses who lack personal knowledge. 114 Excluding such evidence is consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence's
aim to secure promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and the proceeding
justly determined. 115 Congress has apparently taken the stand that
federal courts should not be opened up to unreliable evidence that has

110. Note that Justice Rehnquist, in his partial dissent, questioned the ability of
judges to become "amateur scientists." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part). Some commentators have also raised this
concern. See, e.g., Paul S. Miller et al., Daubert and the Need for Judicial Scientific
Literacy, 77 JUDICATURE, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 254, 254 (probing judges' ability "to
understand at least the rudiments of statistics and probability theory ... [and] obtain
some appreciation of error factors and the implicit limitations on often-used means of
scientific observation, measurement, and detection."). If Daubert was willing to invest
judges with a gatekeeping role for scientific testimony, which in some cases may
actually be as confusing to judges as to juries, the Court would probably have less
misgivings investing judges with a gatekeeping role for nonscientific testimony.
Nonscientific testimony is by its nature less complex than scientific testimony, and trial
judges would have less difficulty assessing its reliability.
111. See FED. R. EVID. 801; FED. R. EVID. 802.
112. See FED. R. EVID. 901.
113. See FED. R. EVID. 1001; FED. R. EVID. 1002.
114. See FED. R. EVID. 602.
115. See FED. R. EVID. 102.
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the great potential to mislead the factfinder. 116 Daubert seconded this
philosophy on behalf of the judiciary.
Unreliable nonscientific expert testimony should be no exception.
Granted, the impetus for Daubert may have been attributable to a
perception that "junk science" had taken over courtrooms. 117 Some
have argued, however, that if anything, there is less assurance of the
accuracy and truthfulness of nonscientific testimony than there is of
scientific testimony. 118 If the opponent of scientific testimony doubts
the results of the proponent's research, the opponent can in most cases
replicate the research to discredit the results. 119 The very possibility
that the opponent will take this action creates a disincentive for
untruthful scientific testimony. 120 For the most part, however, such
cross-party checks on the accuracy of nonscientific testimony are
impossible. 121 Thus, the proponent of untruthful nonscientific testimony will have less worry that the deficiencies of his testimony will be
revealed.
A court's admitting unreliable expert testimony of any kind is
particularly troublesome in criminal cases, where the central objective of
the litigation is always the accurate determination of a defendant's
guilt. 122 A criminal defendant may be more handicapped in challenging expert testimony against him than a civil litigant because of fewer
discovery rights and fewer resources. 123 Furthermore, as noted earlier,

116. Congress actually took some steps towards writing a reliability requirement
into all expert testimony, both scientific and nonscientific. In 1991, the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States proposed
an amendment to Rule 702 which would have written in the requirement that all expert
testimony be "reasonably reliable." Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 156
(1991). The amendment was ultimately withdrawn. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13,
at 2288.
117. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.· In fact, some have even
pointed to the Bendectin litigation involved in Daubert as an area of junk science. See
Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts after Daubert, 78
MINN. L. REV. 1387, 1441 (1994).
118. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2279.
119. See id. at 2279-80.
120. See id. at 2280.
121. See id.
122. Berger, supra note 24, at 1352. Nonscientific experts do appear with some
frequency at criminal trials. During the Chicago Jury Project conducted in the 1960s,
researchers attempted to determine the types of expert witnesses called at criminal trials.
Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2279. Most of the prosecution witnesses testified on
scientific matters. See id. Of the witnesses, 43% were physicians, 22% were experts
in chemical analysis, 10% were handwriting examiners, and 5% were authorities on
intoxication testing. Id. However, 11 % were technical experts on accounting and
appraisal and 6% were police officers or F.B.I. agents. Id.
123. Berger, supra note 24, at 1352-53.
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studies have shown that jurors in criminal cases find experts both
credible and influential in the verdict. 124 Because the Federal Rules of
Evidence were meant to apply to civil and criminal cases equally unless
otherwise indicated, 125 the special concerns a court may have with
regard to criminal cases· should shape its interpretation of Rule 702 and
its standard for the admissibility of nonscientific expert testimony.

IV.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF DAUBERT' S DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE
SCIENTIFIC AND THE NONSCIENTIFIC

A.

Scientific Testimony vs. "Scientific Knowledge"

Whether or not the drafters of Rule 702 meant for "scientific
knowledge" to be parsed from "technical, or other specialized knowledge," Daubert did so. 126 The consequence of this is to permit courts
to apply different standards of admissibility for scientific and nonscientific testimony. If courts do apply different standards, the very first
question such courts should ask upon every proffer of expert testimony
is whether the testimony is of a scientific or nonscientific nature. Only
after a court identifies the nature of the testimony can it then begin to
apply the appropriate standard. The very admissibility of the testimony
might depend on which standard applies, especially if a court's standard
for nonscientific testimony departs substantially from its standard for
scientific testimony. 127

124. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (describing a National Law
Journal/LEXIS poll in which 95% of criminal jurors who heard experts reported that the
testimony was very believable or somewhat believable).
125. FED. R. EVID. ll0l(b).
126. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993). In his
partial dissent, Justice Rehnquist asked, "[D]oes Rule 702 actually contemplate that the
phrase 'scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge' be broken down into
numerous subspecies of expertise, or did its authors simply pick general descriptive
language covering the sort of expert testimony which courts have customarily received?"
Id. at 600 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
127. For instance, consider a court that applies "general acceptance" as its exclusive
test for reliability in the field of design engineering. See Officer v. Teledyne Republic/Sprague, 870 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D. Mass. 1994). In Officer, a case arising out of an
industrial accident, Officer alleged that Teledyne's valve was negligently designed in that
its flexible settings involved erroneous adjustments. Id. at 409. In its motion for
summary judgment, Teledyne challenged the testimony of Officer's expert, Darry Holt,
in part on the ground that Holt's opinions were not supported by field tests or other
empirical data and thus did not satisfy Daubert. Id. at 410. The court rebuffed this
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Even with this need for certain courts to categorize their testimony at
the outset, few actually do so, and the result has caused some confusion.
For instance, recall the Ninth Circuit case of Thomas v. Newton
International Enterprises, 128 wherein the plaintiff's expert, an experienced longshoreman named Kuvakas, opined that the presence of an
unguarded, uncovered deck opening or manhole positioned within two
feet of the bottom of an access ladder is an extremely unusual and
hazardous condition. 129 The Ninth Circuit ruled that, based on
Kuvakas's longshore experience, his testimony should have been
admitted. 13° Clearly, this test for admissibility departed substantially
from Daubert.
An interesting aspect of Thomas appeared in a footnote, where the
court responded to a contention raised by Newton's counsel at oral
argument. 131 There, Newton's counsel contended that under Claar v.
Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 132 the district court had not abused
its discretion in excluding Kuvakas's testimony.13 3
Claar involved expert testimony of a clearly scientific nature-the
causal connection between the plaintiffs' workplace chemical exposure
and their injuries. 134 Yet, nowhere did Claar explicitly identify the
testimony as being scientific in nature. Instead, the court proceeded
directly to its reliability analysis, stating that "the· district court was
affirmatively required to find that the experts' conclusions were based

challenge, stating that Teledyne's argument confused, "scientific" with "technical, or
other specialized knowledge." Id. The court continued, "While Daubert's principles
have valuable application in detemrining the admissibility of controversial and novel
scientific hypothesis, they have less use in fields ... where 'general acceptance' is the
norm ...." Id.
In Officer, the court's applying general acceptance as the test for admissibility may
very well have determined the outcome. If the court had applied Daubert' s essential test
for reliability-whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony was
scientifically valid-the testimony may have been excluded. According to Teledyne,
Holt had not conducted field tests or made use of other empirical data, which would
have called into question the first and third Daubert factors. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at
593-94.
128. 42 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussed supra notes 74-82 and accompanying
text).
129. Id. at 1269.
130. Id. at 1269-70.
131. See id. at 1270 n.3.
132. 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994).
.
133. Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1270 n.3.
134. Claar, 29 F.3d at 500. In Claar, the plaintiffs were a group of 27 people who
brought suit against Burlington Northern, alleging that they had suffered from a variety
of ailments stemming from their exposure to an assortment of chemicals while working
at one of Burlington Northem's shops. Id. Responding to a court order, the plaintiffs
submitted the affidavits of two physicians who would testify on the issue of causation.
Id.
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on scientific knowledge." 135 Taken literally . and in isolation, this
passage could be read to mean that all expert testimony, regardless of its
subject matter, must be "scientific knowledge" in order to be admitted.
Presumably, this was the hook that Newton sunk its teeth into at oral
argument-Claar demands that all expert testimony be based on
scientific knowledge, and Kuvakas's testimony was not based on
scientific knowledge. This was a perfectly reasonable argument in light
of the plain language of Claar and a string of other cases wherein the
Ninth Circuit had failed to identify at the outset whether the testimony
was of a scientific or nonscientific nature before applying Daubert's
standard of reliability.13 6 Thomas responded to Newton's argument by
stating that "Daubert was clearly confined to the evaluation of scientific
expert testimony. . . While a scientific conclusion must be linked in
some fashion. to the scientific method, ... Kuvakas' nonscientific
testimony need only be linked to some body of specialized knowledge
or skills." 137 Any trial judge reading Thomas ought to have taken
away the lesson that he should always identify whether expert testimony
is of a scientific or.nonscientific nature before beginning his admissibility analysis. Only expert testimony derived in some fashion from the
scientific method need qualify as "scientific knowledge." It is a flat
overstatement to say, as the Ninth Circuit did in Claar, that district
courts are affirmatively required to find that experts' conclusions are
based on scientific knowledge.
The Claar-Thomas phenomenon stemmed from certain ambiguities in
Daubert. 138 In Daubert, because the Court was faced with expert
testimony that was so clearly of a scientific nature, it began its

135. Id. at 502.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 1994). In
Rincon, which involved the expert testimony of a psychologist on eyewitness
identification, the court stated:
The Court [in Daubert] established a two-part test for determining whether to
admit expert testimony: "[T]he trial judge must determine at the outset,
pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or
determine a fact in issue."
Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)). For
clarity's sake and to avoid future arguments like those made by Newton's counsel in
Thomas, the court should have stated- that Daubert established a two-part test for
determining whether to admit scientific expert testimony, not all expert testimony.
137. Thomas, 42 F.3d at 1270 n.3.
138. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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admissibility analysis without having to explain why the testimony
would have to meet the reliability requirements of scientific testimony.
So, as a case upon which lower courts could model their admissibility
analysis, Daubert is insufficient. It does not provide an illustration for
how a court, which has differing admissibility standards for scientific
and nonscientific testimony, must settle the question of whether the
testimony is scientific before it can perform its admissibility analysis.
Daubert also unintentionally created a hitch in district courts'
admissibility analysis when it tied its reliability requirement into the term
"scientific knowledge," rather than the "assist the trier of fact" portion
of Rule 702 or somewhere else. 139 As a result, when the Court
referred to scientific knowledge, it was referring to "a standard of
evidentiary reliability," not a standard for establishing the
epistemological foundation of an expert's opinions. So, Daubert allowed
courts to differentiate between testimony on scientific and nonscientific
branches of knowledge, but it stripped from Rule 702 the very language
which might be used in making this differentiation.
To illustrate, consider this passage in Daubert: "Faced with a proffer
of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the
outset . . . whether the expert is proposing to testify to . . . scientific
knowledge." 140 The sentence seems to say that if an expert is
testifying on a scientific subject, the trial judge must determine at the
outset if the expert is proposing to offer reliable testimony. That is
ridiculous, because what expert would not advertise his testimony as
reliable? A more plausible reading is that the first step a court must take
upon a proffer of expert testimony is to determine if the testimony is
scientific knowledge. This is problematic as well. If the testimony is
not scientific knowledge, meaning that its methodology is not based on
scientifically valid principles, presumably it should be excluded. This
is precisely the Claar-Thomas phenomenon. If courts always work
backwards like this-determining if testimony is scientific knowledge
before deciding which standard of admissibility applies-all nonscientific
testimony would be excluded because not based on scientifically valid
methodologies. The solution to the Claar-Thomas phenomenon is for
courts that have differing admissibility standards for scientific and
nonscientific testimony to always clarify the nature of the testimony
before beginning their admissibility analysis. 141

139. See id. at 590; FED. R. Evrn. 702.
140. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
141. The model offered by this Comment recommends a reliability requirement for
all expert testimony, although the proposed standard for how to determine reliability is,
in some respects, different for scientific and nonscientific testimony. See infra Part
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B.

A Court's Failure to Articulate a Standard for Distinguishing the
Scientific from the Nonscientific

Courts which have differing standards for the admissibility of
scientific and nonscientific testimony must also develop a standard for
determining what makes testimony scientific or not. 142 Without such
a standard, courts will be able to manipulate the evidence's admissibility
simply by giving it an arbitrary classification.
The ramifications of a court's failure to articulate some standard for
what is scientific is illustrated in two post-Daubert cases decided by the
First Circuit:
United States v. Alzanki143 and United States v.
144
Brien.
In Alzanki, a husband and wife were accused of keeping
their maid, a Sri Lankan national, in a state of involuntary servitude by
means of physical abuse and threats. 145 The defendants argued that the
maid often ventured outside their locked apartment during her alleged
involuntary servitude, and given the normal human instinct for selfpreservation, one would expect an unrestrained person threatened with
such alleged physical abuse to flee her abusers at the first opportunity. 146 The government countered by offering the testimony of Ann
Burgess, a "victimologist," who testified that abuse victims often harbor
the opposite impulse-overwhelmed by fear they remain with their
abusers. 147 On appeal, the defendants contested their unsuccessful
motion in limine to preclude this testimony. 148

V.C.2; app. B. For courts adopting this approach, the question whether testimony is
scientific or nonscientific is pertinent only to assist judges in applying a standard of
evidentiary reliability that accounts for the epistemological bases of experts' opinions.
142. One trio of commentators has observed, "If lawyers and judges hope to apply
the Daubert test rationally, they will have to learn what distinguishes science from other
forms of knowledge-what is it that makes science scientific." Bert Black et al., Science
and the Law in the Wake a/Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 715, 751 (1994).
143. 54 F.3d 994 (1st Cir. 1995).
144. 59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 1995).
145. Alzanki, 54 F.3d at 999. Courts probably see few cases of involuntary
servitude in this day and age. However, here the defendants were immigrants of Kuwait,
a country that permits restriction on noncitizen movement, especially household servants.
Id. at 1005 n.10.
146. Id. at 1005.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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The Alzanki court described Ms. Burgess's testimony as "somewhat
technical." 149
According to the court, the gatekeeping function
contemplated by Rule 702 essentially requires the trial judge to assess
whether it is "reasonably likely that the expert possesses specialized
knowledge which will assist the trier better to understand a fact in
issue." 150 Nowhere did the court analyze the scientific validity of Ms.
Burgess's opinions or mention the Daubert factors. Although the court
did discuss her training and experience, it did not scrutinize the actual
methodologies upon which her opinions were based. 151
Some might question the court's determination that Ms. Burgess's
testimony was nonscientific. After all, victimology involves the study
of human behavior, and as such would fall within the field of psychology. Psychology is a branch of knowledge that many regard as scientific. 152 Perhaps the court believed that "not very complex scientific
testimony" should be scaled down to the classification "somewhat
technical."
The First Circuit's conclusion that Ms. Burgess's testimony was
nonscientific is particularly suspect after United States v. Brien. 153 In
Brien, the defendant was on trial for bank robbery. 154 The prosecution
intended to introduce several witnesses who could identify the defendant
as the perpetrator of the robbery. 155 In response, the defense offered
the expert testimony of Alexander Yarmey, a professor of psychology
and an expert on the weakness of eyewitness identification. 156 Professor Yarmey was prepared to testify to the various factors that could
undermine a witness's observation, retention, and .retrieval. 157 The trial
judge denied the defense's first two motions to introduce Professor
Yarmey's testimony, denying the second because the proffer was too
general and did not satisfy the foundational requirements under
Daubert. 158 Professor Yarmey eventually filed an eight-page affidavit,
most of which was comprised of general statements regarding the

149. Id. at 1006.
150. Id. at 1005 (quoting United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1183 (1st Cir.
1993)).
151. See id. at 1006.
152. For instance, Webster's defines psychology as "the science of the mind or of
mental phenomena and activities." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1833 (1986) (emphasis added).
153. 59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 1995).
154. Id. at 275.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 275-76.
157. Id. at 276.
158. Id.
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sources that create or compound error in eyewitness identifications. 159
Neither the affidavit nor the submission by the defense purported to set
forth in detail the scientific foundations for any of Professor Yarmey's
conclusions. 160 The trial judge excluded the testimony, expressing a
variety of concerns about the basis for Professor Yarmey's assumptions,
as well as "the fit and usefulness and misleading qualities" of the
testimony. 161
Without adopting a blanket rule that qualified expert testimony on
eyewitness identifications must routinely be excluded, the First Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling on the ground that the defense failed
to provide the district court judge with data or literature underlying the
expert's opinions. 162 According to the court, "this procedure was
justified both in order to determine reliability under Daubert and to
allow the judge to gauge whether the testimony would be helpful to the
jury or would confuse or mislead instead." 163 The court pointed to
Daubert's reliability requirement in other portions of its analysis as
well. 164 While not affirmatively identifying the testimony as scientific,
nowhere did the court mention the terms "specialized" or "technical
knowledge." One cannot help but notice the court's reluctance to tread
near the issue of what type of knowledge was involved.
Considering the position the court was in, this trepidation was
warranted. Because Professor Yarmey did not even go to the trouble to
provide the information underlying his opinions, the court surely wanted
to affirm the district court's ruling and exclude the testimony. However,
this would amount to excluding the testimony on the basis of reliability,
a basis that Alzanki had not incorporated into its admissibility analysis.
To get around Alzanki and other close-call cases in which the court had
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting the trial judge).
162. Id. at 277.
163. Id.
164. See id. at 277-78 ("Daubert, as well as common prudence, entitled the judge
to require such underlying information ...."). In Brien's discussion of other circuits
who had encountered proffers of expert testimony on eyewitness identification, Brien
cited a Ninth Circuit case in which the Ninth Circuit had analyzed the testimony's
admissibility under Daubert, utilizing the Daubert factors to assess scientific validity.
See id. at 277; United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 923-24 (9th Cir. 1994). Quite
clearly, the Brien court knew that there would be a great disparity between its analysis
and other circuits' if it were not to insist on some showing of reliability for Professor
Yarmey's opinions.
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not read a reliability requirement into borderline nonscientific testimony, 165 the Brien court refrained from identifying the testimony as either
scientific or nonscientific. The court did this in spite of the fact that the
experts in both Alzanki and Brien were testifying on matters rooted in
psychology.
The Alzanki-Brien phenomenon is a consequence of a court having
different standards of admissibility for scientific and nonscientific
testimony but not having a standard for distinguishing between the two
types of testimony. By neglecting to classify the testimony or by simply
labeling it in an arbitrary fashion, the court can manipulate what
testimony gets admitted. This result can only undermine the public's
confidence in the rule permitting opinion testimony, mobilizing
agreement around Judge Learned Hand's belief that "[n]o rule is subject
to greater abuse . . . ." 166
C.

How a Court Might Distinguish the
Scientific from the Nonscientific

Courts with differing standards for the admissibility of scientific and
nonscientific testimony must necessarily arrive at some standard for
determining what qualities make an opinion scientific. Granted, this is
a daunting task which would put many scientists at a loss for words. 167

165. See, e.g., United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995). In Shay, the
court excluded the testimony of an expert psychiatrist who offered to testify that the
defendant suffered from a mental disorder that caused him to make grandiose statements
against self-interest. Id. at 133. The·court identified the psychiatrist's testimony as
"specialized" and did not apply Daubert' s reliability requirement. Id.
As with Alzanki, people might criticize Shay's decision not to label this testimony as
scientific and apply Daubert's standard of reliability. According to Webster's,
psychiatry is a branch of medicine dealing with disorders of the mind. WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 482 (1986). Medicine, in turn, is defined as
the science of treating and preventing diseases. Id. at 375.
166. United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689, 693 (2d Cir. 1932).
167. See generally HENRY H. BAUER, SCIENTIFIC LITERACY AND THE MYTH OF THE
SCIENTIFIC METHOD 23.-28 (1992) (exploring what makes one a "scientist"). According
to Bauer, "chemists and biologists and other scientists come to different and even
contradictory views of what science is." Id. at 28.
The difficulty in defining "scientific" has inhibited courts from making such an
attempt. For example, in Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc., 82 F.3d 1513 (10 Cir.
1996), the court expressly declined to reach the issue of whether Daubert applies to all
expert testimony. Id. at 1516 n.l. Nevertheless, the court held that application of the
Daubert factors is unwarranted in cases where expert testimony is based solely upon
experience or training. Id. at 1518. The Compton court seemed tempted to limit
Daubert's applicability to scientific testimony, but did not want to confront the meaning
of "scientific."
The Fourth Circuit has also backed away from confronting the meaning of "scientific."
See Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d lOll, 1016 n.6 (4th Cir. 1997). The Freeman
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There is no "right" answer and this Comment certainly does not suggest
there is one. However, rather than pouring over volumes of literature in
this pursuit, lower courts might be better off focusing on the Supreme
Court's limited discussion of science in Daubert. In Daubert, Justice
Blackmun stated that, "in order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an
inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method." 168 In
other words, opinions are of a scientific nature if they were sought to be
validated through the scientific method.
The modem view of the scientific method, according to scientist
George Gale, is as follows: "[T]he scientist first sets up an experiment;
second, observes what occurs in the experiment; third, reaches a
preliminary hypothesis to describe the occurrence; fourth, runs further
experiments to test the hypothesis; and finally, corrects or modifies the
hypothesis in light of the results of the extended experimental test." 169
While this definition speaks of experimental testing, the scientific
method also incorporates observational testing. 170 Many hypotheses,
for practical reasons, cannot be experimentally tested. 171 For example,
consider a psychologist studying the effects of the battered woman
syndrome. 172 The psychologist would not intentionally batter women

court stated:
We need not here decide the question that the Supreme Court left open, i.e.,
whether the Daubert analysis applies outside the scientific context, because
Case misunderstands the Daubert test in attempting to apply it here. . ..
Essentially, Case does not challenge [the expert]' s "reasoning or methodology"
but his ultimate conclusion . . . . In cases like this one, where an expert relies
on his experience and training and not a particular methodology to reach his
conclusions, "application of the Daubert [analysis] is unwarranted."
Id. [second brackets in original]. Like Compton, the Freeman court found that Daubert
applies to testimony dependent on some methodology. Also like Compton, the Freeman
court declined to explore how use of a methodology might inhere testimony with
scientific character.
168. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
169. GEORGE GALE, THEORY OF SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY,
LOGIC, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 13 (1979).
170. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2276; F. JAMES RUTHERFORD & ANDREW
AHLGREN, SCIENCE FOR ALL AMERICANS 7 (1990) ("The essence of science is validation
by observation.").
171. See CARL. G. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION AND OTHER
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 3 (1965) (making this point).
172. "The battered woman syndrome is a descriptive term that refers to a cluster of
typical behaviors and emotional reactions that may develop in a woman repeatedly
subjected to mental and physical abuse by a male with whom she is intimately
involved." Neil J. Vidmar & Regina A. Schuller, Juries and Expert Evidence: Social
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by varying amounts and then study the effects. Rather, the psychologist
would typically conduct interviews and field studies of already battered
women, perhaps using comparison groups of nonbattered women or
battered women who did not kill, and systematically interpret the
data. 173 So long as the psychologist corrects or modifies his hypothesis in light of his observations, he would be following the scientific
method. 174
By the same token that some hypotheses are experimentally untestable,
experimental testing is altogether unnecessary in certain branches of
knowledge. For instance, taxonomy, which concerns the classification
of plants and animals, rarely requires experimentation to draw conclusions. Observation of the natural world and concomitant data accumulation suffice. Other primarily observational sciences include astronomy,
biology, and geology. 175 Through inductive reasoning, specialists in
these fields generalize a law or theory from a finite list of observations.176 Again, as long as these specialists modify or discard falsified
hypotheses, they are following the scientific method.
Therefore, if a trial judge is faced with a proffer expert testimony,
he should demand that the expert identify the' bases for his opinions.
The expert would be required to explain how he knows what he claims
to know. If the expert claims that his opinions were the product of the
scientific method and the reasonable inferences made during its course,
the court should apply Daubert's standard of admissibility. If the expert
claims that his opinions were gained through experiences of a more
general nature, and not by some methodology of forming hypotheses and
then engaging in experimentation or observation to confirm or falsify the
hypotheses, the court · should resort to its applicable non-Daubert
standard for admissibility. 177
Daubert's conception of science focused on how the expert acquired
his knowledge, not on the subject matter involved. Similarly, a district
court's foremost consideration in determining whether to apply Daubert
should be the epistemological bases of the expert's opinions. However,
of

Framework Testimony, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 133, 148-49 (1989).
173. See Krista L. Duncan, Comment, "Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics"?
Psychological Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom After Daubert, 71 IND. L.J. 753, 766
(1996) (discussing this methodology).
174. See generally BAUER, supra note 167, at 19-23 (describing observational
testing).
175. See id. at 25.
176. See generally A.F. CHALMERS, WHAT Is THIS THING CALLED SCIENCE? 2-5
(2d ed. 1982) (discussing the principle of induction).
177. For more on the scientific method and the extent to which it differs from the
experiences of daily life, see infra Part V.C.l.
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once a court decides on its admissibility standard and begins its actual
admissibility analysis, it should not ignore that certain branches of
knowledge lend themselves more to validation through the scientific
method than other branches. 178 In fact, some scholars define science
in terms of subject matter, rather than as a process for producing knowledge. For instance, professor and scientist Henry Bauer offers,
"[A]mong the many possible definitions of science, ... science most
fundamentally and undeniably means the study of nature ...." 179
Another scholar has written, "[W]e may perhaps say that science is a
human activity developing an historically cumulative body of interrelated
techniques, empirical knowledge, and theories, referring to the natural
world." 180 Nature, as used by both of these scholars, includes not only
the physical world, but also the behavioral patterns of humans and other
animals. 181
To draw this all together into some principle, when the body of
knowledge upon which an expert is testifying concerns the study of
nature, and the expert claims not to have validated his opinions through
the scientific method, courts should be skeptical of the evidence. 182

178. See RUTHERFORD & AHLGREN, supra note 170, at 4-5 ("There are many
matters that cannot usefully be examined in a scientific way.").
179. BAUER, supra note 167, at 37.
180. STEPHEN F. MASON, A HISTORY OF THE SCIENCES 599 (1962).
181. Social scientists studying human behavior look for consistent patterns of
individual and social behavior and for scientific explanations of those patterns. See
RUTHERFORD & AHLGREN, supra note 170, at 79. Human behavior is affected both by
genetic inheritance and by experience. See id. at 80.
182. What constitutes "nature" is not a discrete classification, and courts should
apply a sliding scale to the degree of skepticism that they attach to opinion evidence that
in some way involves nature, but which was not validated by the scientific method. For
instance, courts should be very skeptical of expert testimony that pertains to a matter of
embryology and that the expert does not claim to have validated through the scientific
method. On the other hand, courts might be less skeptical of expert testimony that
pertains to a matter of crocodile mating behavior and that the expert does not claim to
have validated through the scientific method. Embryology simply seems to demand
validation through testing to a greater degree than crocodile mating behavior. This
Comment does not suggest any formula for how to calibrate the sliding scale. A judge's
intuition on the matter will usually suffice.
One might point out that, so long as the judge is filtering expert testimony according
to subject matter, it would also be fair for him to screen for testimony not involving
nature, but which testimony an expert does claim to substantiate by the scientific
method. For instance, should an expert testifying on a matter such as truck and auto
towing, whose opinions are founded on knowledge acquired through the scientific
method, be held to Daubert' s standard of reliability? The answer is yes, although a
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Disregard of the scientific method should not be a means to dodge
Daubert's reliability inquiry. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized this general notion when it stated:
[l]t seems exactly backwards that experts who purport to rely on general
engineering principles and practical experience might escape screening by the
district court simply by stating that their conclusions were not reached by any
particular method or technique. The moral of this approach would be, the less
factual support for an expert's opinions, the better. 1

To illustrate how application of this skepticism might play out,
consider an expert testifying on the behavioral characteristics of
individuals accused of child sexual abuse. Suppose that the. expert
claims that the knowledge underlying his opinions is derived from
untested Freudian psychoanalytic theory, rather than from research
according to the scientific method. Because the expert is advertising his
testimony as nonscientific, courts which have differing admissibility
standards for scientific and nonscientific testimony would not apply
Daubert. However, because· the expert is testifying on an aspect of
nature-human behavior-courts should approach their admissibility
analysis with strong doubts as to the testimony's reliability. 184
In summary, the inquiry into the subject matter of an expert's
testimony should follow a court's determination that the epistemological
basis of an expert's testimony is nonscientific. The court's subsequent
identification of the subject matter as involving "nature" should serve as
a filter through which the court attaches to the testimony an inference
that it is unreliable. 185

court might be lenient in applying such factors as falsifiability and rate of error. No
inference of reliability would be warranted. As discussed infra Part V.C, with a
borderline case that does not fit paradigmatic application of the scientific method, a court
should reach identical outcomes whether it travels down the scientific or nonscientific
strands of the reliability inquiry.
183. Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997).
184. See generally James T. Richardson et al., The Problems of Applying Daubert
to Psychological Syndrome Evidence, 79 JUDICATURE, July-Aug. 1995, at 10, 13 (stating
that given the nature and practice of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, it is unlikely that
testimony based on Freudian principles could be admitted as scientific evidence under
the Daubert guidelines).
185. Courts should not feel confined to limiting this inference of unreliability to the
admittedly vague classification of "nature." For example, consider a recent Seventh
Circuit case in which an expert in a products liability action offered an opinion with
regard to the feasibility of alternative design, yet did not purport to have substantiated
his opinion through the scientific method. See Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362,
369 (7th Cir. 1996). The court held:
[T]he opinions offered by Dr. Carpenter in this case clearly lend themselves
to testing and substantiation by the scientific method. The district court clearly
acted well within its discretion in concluding that the absence of such testing
indicated that the witness' proffered opinions could not fairly be characterized
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V.

A MODEL FOR COURTS TO USE IN PERFORMING THEIR
ADMISSIBILITY ANALYSIS UNDER RULE 702

This model is intended to assist federal courts in conducting their
admissibility analysis of any proffer of expert testimony under Rule 702.
The model is aspirational and not strictly bound to any court's precedent,
although the model is consistent with the language of Daubert.
Appendices A and B provide a skeleton of the model, highlighting the
main questions trial judges must ask in their gatekeeping role.
The issues affecting admissibility are set forth in the model in the
sequence in which courts should approach them. Although the model
addresses the qualifications and assistance requirements, most of the
discussion is devoted to the reliability inquiry, which courts have
referred to as the "touchstone" of Rule 702. 186
The model is simply offered to provide a court with ideas, not to
suggest that testimony be excluded in any particular case. Its
overarching theme is flexibility in application, but insistence on
reliability.
A.

Qualifications

The first question a court might ask upon the proffer of any type of
expert testimony is whether the expert is qualified to act as a witness.
The approach suggested by Margaret A. Berger in her contribution to the
Federal Judicial Center's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence is for

as scientific knowledge.
Id. Although the failure to follow the scientific method appears dispositive, the court
also considered other factors in its decision to affirm the district court's exclusion of the
testimony. See id. at 370.
As the last paragraph might intimate, identifying expert testimony as involving
"nature" and attaching to it an inference that it is unreliable when it has not been
validated through the scientific method is a compromise. If one defines science only by
the subject matter, one will have the nearly impossible task of drawing lines on the
subject matter that constitutes science. This Comment and the model it provides borrow
Daubert's approach, defining science in terms of the epistemological bases of the
expert's knowledge. As a consequence, some attempt should be made to screen for
expert testimony that, due to its subject matter, should have been validated through the
scientific method, but was not.
186. E.g., United States v. Rouse, 100 F.3d 560, 567 (8th Cir. 1996).
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courts to undertake a two-step inquiry. 187 Berger's two-step inquiry
is an effective process for approaching·Rule 702's qualifications requirement, and this model essentially adopts it.
Under the first prong of this inquiry, a court must determine whether
the proffered expert has minimal educational or experiential qualifications in the field upon which he proposes to testify. 188 According to
Rule 702, which courts generally agree governs issues relating to an
expert's qualifications, an expert may be qualified to testify by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. 189 The Advisory
Committee's note states that "within the scope of the rule are not only
experts in the strictest sense of the word, e.g., physicians, physicists, and
architects, but also the large group sometimes called 'skilled' witnesses,
such as bankers or landowners testifying to land values." 190 The fact
that an expert has a particular title or degree, or the fact that he lacks a
particular title or degree, should not be dispositive in qualifying him. 191
Furthermore, the fact that a proffered expert has never before been
qualified as an expert witness should not carry too much weight. As the
Second Circuit has observed, "even the most qualified expert must have
his first day in court." 192
If the expert passes the first prong, the court should then compare the
expert's area of expertise with the particular opinions the expert seeks
to offer. 193 This second prong is more focused than the first, and its
aim is to make sure that there· is always a conjunction between the

187. Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 37, 55 (1994). Professor Berger's contribution provides a
framework for judges in considering disputes over the admissibility of various kinds of
scientific evidence. See id. at 43. Berger states that many sections of her paper,
particularly the section dealing with an expert's qualifications, have application beyond
merely scientific testimony. Id. at 44.
188. See id. at 55.
189. FED. R. Evrn. 702.
190. FED. R. Evrn. 702 advisory committee's note.
191. Berger, supra note 187, at 58. According to the Third Circuit, "it is an abuse
of discretion to exclude testimony simply because the trial court does not deem the
proposed expert to be best qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the
specialization that the court considers most appropriate." Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S.
Co., Inc., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3rd Cir. 1996).
Some courts might deviate from this language of Holbrook, however, if the expert
happens to be in the employ of a company or industry whose practices are being
challenged. The Second Circuit has noted, "If the only experts permitted to testify
inevitably represent the same side of a civil case, those who possess these experts can,
for all practical purposes, set their own standards." Stagl v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 117
F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1997).
192. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 937 (2d Cir. 1993).
193. See Berger, supra note 187, at 55.
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expert's qualifications and his opinions. 194 To some extent, this
inquiry will overlap with the court's analysis of the reliability of an
expert's opinions. 195 The overlap will be particularly apparent in the
case of nonscientific testimony, where the reliability inquiry centers upon
the general experiential bases underlying the expert's opinion, rather than
upon the scientific validity of his reasoning and principles. 196 To form
a bridge between the qualifications and reliability requirements, a court,
in conducting its reliability analysis, might take into account the degree
of specialized knowledge an expert possesses about the particular issues
in dispute. 197
A court may determine that an expert is qualified to offer opinions on
only some of the issues on which he proposes to testify. 198 In such
situations, the court may impose restrictions on the opinions that the
expert will be. allowed to express. 199 For instance, a court may restrict
an expert's testimony to the field in which he has specialized knowledge.zoo

194. See Whiting v. Boston Edison Co., 891 F. Supp. 12, 24 (D. Mass. 1995) ("Just
as a lawyer is not by general education and experience qualified to give an expert
opinion on every subject of the law, so too a scientist or medical doctor is not presumed
to have expert knowledge about every conceivable scientific principle or disease.").
195. Berger, supra note 187, at 55; see also Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 95
F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 1996). In Barrett, the plaintiffs alleged personal injury and
property damage as a result of alleged chemical exposure to chemicals at two federal
superfund sites. Id. at 377. One of the plaintiffs' experts, Dr. Schroeder (no first name
given), an ecologist, offered to testify that mammalian species at the sites, specifically
the cotton rat, had been affected by possible exposure. Id. at 382. The Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision to exclude the testimony, because Schroeder could
not establish with any scientific reliability whether there was an exposure parallel
between the cotton rats and human beings. Id. The Fifth Circuit determined that the
testimony was unreliable, in large part, by analyzing Dr. Schroeder's qualifications. See
id. Because Schroeder's expertise was limited to the behavior patterns of rats, the court
found that he could not offer a credible scientific opinion regarding the source of the
rats' chromosomal damage. Id. Barrett stands as a prime example of a court
overlapping its reliability and qualifications inquiries.
196. See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147, 1154 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he
general reliability of non-scientific expert testimony does not always neatly separate
itself from whether the particular expert in the case is qualified and whether the
testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact ....").
197. See Berger, supra note 187, at 55-56.
198. Id. at 63.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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B.

The Assistance Requirement

The next phase of a court's admissibility analysis should be Rule
702's assistance requirement. 201 This entails an inquiry into the
testimony's relevance to the facts of a case, as well as an inquiry into
the testimony's helpfulness.

1.

Relevance

According to Daubert, the "assist the trier of fact" portion of Rule 702
goes primarily to relevance, 202 by which the Court meant that expert
testimony must be sufficiently tied to the facts of a case such that it will
aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute. 203 Borrowing language from
Downing, the Court described this consideration as one of "fit."204
Evidently, the Court seized upon the obvious truth that expert testimony
not relating to an issue in the case cannot possibly assist the factfinder
in reaching a verdict.
Questions of relevancy typically arise if an expert's proffered opinion
relates to facts or data that have not been adequately established in the
case. 205 A prime example occurred in Pomella v. Regency Coach
Lines, Ltd.,206 wherein the plaintiff was injured when the car in which
she was a passenger was struck by a bus. 207 In the suit against the bus
driver and the owner of the bus, the plaintiff offered three experts to
testify that a non-negligent bus driver would have been able to avoid the
collision. 208 Whether the bus could have avoided the collision depend-

201. As do some courts, this Comment will refer to the "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" portion of Rule 702 as the
"assistance requirement." See, e.g., United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir.
1995).
202. Even if Daubert had not read a relevance requirement into Rule 702, Rule 402
states that all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided and all evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 402.
203. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993).
204. Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
One court used this example to illustrate fit:
[I]f a plaintiff offers scientific testimony that a particular chemical causes
cancer in rats in order to prove that the chemical also causes cancer in
humans, the testimony will not fit the facts of the case and must be excluded
unless the plaintiff also establishes that the expert can reliably.extrapolate from
rats to humans.
Grimes v. Hoffman-LaRouche, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D.N.H. 1995).
205. See Berger, supra note 187, at 47.
206. 899 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (also discussed supra note 104).
207. Id. at 337.
208. Id. at 339-40.
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ed in part on the coefficient of friction between the bus's tires and the
road, which was in dispute because this test was never conducted at the
time of the accident. 209 Although all the eyewitnesses agreed that the
road was slick, the eyewitnesses disagreed on whether the road was icy,
snowy, or merely wet, a matter that would have affected the coefficient
of friction. 210 The plaintiff's experts purported to estimate the coefficient of friction by choosing the lowest coefficient from the range for
snow-covered pavement. 211
The district court excluded the plaintiff's experts because of "lack of
fit," 212 stating that the experts' estimation was simply an arbitrary
choice of a midpoint value within the possible range of coefficients. 213
Although the experts claimed that their estimation of the coefficient of
friction was most valuable to the defendants, the court concluded that,
in fact, it was favorable to the plaintiff. 214 Because of the speculative
nature of the experts' testimony, the court found that it was irrelevant.215
There may be cases in which a court's relevancy inquiry overlaps with
its reliability inquiry. One such situation is when it appears that the
expert's methodology is flawed because it involved facts or assumptions
not found in the case at hand. 216 The Pomella court, for instance,
could have reasonably excluded the plaintiff's experts from a reliability
standpoint. 217
Another scenario in which relevancy overlaps reliability is when an
expert's conclusions are not commensurate with the scope of the

209. Id. at 340.
210. Id. at 342.
211. Id. at 343.
212. Id.
213 Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. See Berger, supra note 187, at 49.
217. Sometimes a court's relevance inquiry will overlap with its reliability and its
Rule 703 inquiries. See, e.g., Guillory v. Domtar Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1331 (5th
Cir. 1996). In Guillory, the court ultimately excluded the expert's testimony because it
was unreliable, but added for good measure:· "Certainly nothing in Rule 703 requires a
court to admit an opinion based on facts that are indisputably wrong. Even if Rule 703
will not require the exclusion of such an unfounded opinion, general principles of
relevance will." Id. (quoting Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1114
(5th Cir. 1991)).
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methodology he employed. 218 Such a scenario occurred in Vadala v.
Teledyne Industries, Inc., 219 where the executrix of the estate of a pilot
killed in an plane crash brought a negligence and breach of warranty
action against the manufacturer of the plane's engine. 220 The crash
was apparently caused when a part in the right engine came loose from
its bolts, causing oil to drain out and the engine to fail. 221 An investigation revealed that at some point-either during flight or afterwards in
the ground fire-the right engine damper had polymerized. 222
The plaintiff's expert, Roy Bourgault, alleged that the right-engine
damper polymerization occurred during flight, as opposed to in the
ground fire, which had caused the bolts to loosen. 223 Bourgault had
two bases for his opinion. The first basis was his observation that the
rubber oil seal and O rings adjacent to the damper in the right engine
showed no signs of heat damage from the ground fire 224 Bourgault
reasoned that any ground fire sufficient to cause polymerization would
have also altered the appearance of the rubber oil seal and O rings.225
The shortcoming of Bourgault's testimony was that he had no idea what
temperature would be required to alter the appearance of the O rings and
oil seal. 226 The second basis for Bourgault's opinion was four documents that suggested heat may cause in-flight damper failure in some
circumstances. 227
The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to exclude
Bourgault's testimony. 228 Although the court stressed the pertinence
of Daubert's precept that an expert's testimony must rest on a reliable
foundation and be relevant to the task at hand, the court did not specify
which of these two conditions the testimony failed to pass. 229 The
court did not exclude the testimony because of any flawed scientific
principle-heat can cause in-flight-polymerization- there was just no
substantial basis for concluding that it had done so here. The court

218. See infra Part V.C.4 for a discussion of how, as a matter of evidentiary
reliability, the scope of an expert's conclusions should be commensurate with the
methodology employed.
219. 44 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1995).
220. Id. at 36-37.
221. Id. at 38.
222. Id. Polymerization occurs when the silicone fluid in a damper is exposed to
high temperatures, causing the silicone to solidify. When polymerization occurs, the
damper's effectiveness is decreased. Id.
223. Id.
225.
226.
227.
228.

224.

Id.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 39.
Id.

229.

See id.
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stated, "We agree with the district court that the factual basis and
process of reasoning relied on by the plaintiffs' expert do not make his
conclusions viable." 230
Some have argued that Vadala excluded the testimony simply on the
basis of relevancy. 231 However, one could also make a case that the
court excluded the testimony on the basis of reliability. When the court
spoke of the viability of Bourgault's conclusions, it was expressing
doubt that Bourgault could make the leap from his methodology of
examining the O rings and oil seal and reviewing four ambiguous
documents, to claiming that the right-engine damper polymerized during
flight. In this sense, the court found that Bourgault's testimony was
simply not supported by, or not commensurate with, the methodology he
employed. This would be an issue of reliability.
2.

Helpfulness

The second prong of the assistance requirement is more directly in line
with the denotation of assist, which is "to help." 232 This aspect of the
assistance requirement was described by the Advisory Committee in this
way:
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than
the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to
determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue
without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the
subject involved in the dispute. 233

Although modern authorities conflict, the helpfulness requirement should
not require that experts only testify on subjects beyond the ken of lay
juries. 234 As some commentators have argued, experts may well aid
230. Id. at 38.
231. See Fenner, supra note 15, at 1005-06 (making this argument).
232. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 132 (1986) (defining
assist as to "help").
233. FED. R. Evrn. 702 advisory committee's note (quoting Mason Ladd, Expert
Testimony, 5 V AND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952)); see also United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d
126, 132 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting this portion of the Advisory Committee's note).
234. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 60, at 696-97 (arguing that the
helpfulness requirement should not require that experts only testify on subjects beyond
the ken of lay juries). But cf Roback v. V.I.P. Transp. Inc., 90 F.3d 1207, 1215 (7th
Cir. 1996). In Roback, an expert in visual perception of automobile drivers offered to
testify that a driver's being distracted compounds the difficulties of his perceiving
relative velocities, as his focus is diverted from the visual cues by which he can assess
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the jury in determining even familiar matters, in virtue of experience or
training that provides a more thorough or refined understanding than
ordinary experience provides. 235 In situations where the expert's
testimony really is not helpful because the subject matter is simple or
familiar, Rule 403 may be just as useful an outlet to exclude the
testimony as Rule 702. 236
Unites States v. Rincon237 provides an illustration of a court excluding testimony on the basis of helpfulness, and combining Rules 702 and
403 analysis to do so. In Rincon, the defendant was indicted on two
counts of unarmed. robbery. 238 The district court denied Rincon's pretrial motion in limine in which he sought to introduce the expert
testimony of Dr. Kathy Pezdek, a Ph.D. in psychology. 239 If permitted
to testify, Pezdek would have explained, among other things, the effects
of various psychological factors on eyewitness identifications. 240 One
of the bases upon which the district court excluded the proposed
testimony was that the testimony invaded the province of the jury in that
it did not assist the trier of fact. 241 After a jury trial, Rincon was
convicted of both robberies. 242
In its inquiry into the assistance requirement, the Ninth Circuit
conceded that Pezdek's proposed testimony was no doubt relevant to
Rincon's defense. 243 The court stated, however, that the determination
the evidence was relevant did not end the inquiry. 244 Under Daubert,
a district court may still exclude testimony relevant to expert evidence

his own speed in relation to that of other vehicles. Id. The Seventh Circuit upheld the
exclusion of this expert's testimony, stating that any juror who drives would have readily
understood the effects of driver distraction without this. testimony. Id. The. court
reached this decision even though the expert formerly worked at the Transportation
Research Institute at the University of Michigan, and even though his testimony included
some calculations specific to the underlying accident. See id.
235. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 60, at 697.
236. Id.; see FED. R. Evrn. 403 (stating that even relevant evidence should be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by such dangers as confusion
of the issues or waste of time).
237. 28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994).
238. Id. at 922.
239. Id. at 922-23.
240. Id. According to Dr. Pezdek, empirical research contradicted numerous lay
notions of eyewitness identifications. Id.
241. Id. at 923.
242. Id. at 922. On Rincon's first appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's exclusion of the testimony. After the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, the
Court remanded Rincon in light of Daubert. The district court upheld its earlier decision
to exclude the expert testimony and the case again came before the Ninth Circuit. Id.
243. Id. at 925.
244. Id.
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pursuant to Rule 403. 245 In light of this, the court noted that Rincon's
own article on expert eyewitness testimony, which he had submitted to
supplement the record, indicated that it remained to be seen whether
experts can enhance jurors' ability to distinguish accurate from
inaccurate witnesses, or whether the dangers of such testimony outweigh
its probative value. 246 The court concluded, "Given the powerful
nature of expert testimony, coupled with its potential to mislead the jury,
we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that the
proffered evidence would not assist the trier of fact and that it was likely
to mislead the jury." 247 In essence, the court borrowed language from
both Rules 702 and 403, reaching an outcome that reflected "the flexible
approach outlined in Daubert." 248 The court maintained the essential
balancing test of Rule 403, although substituted the "assist trier of fact"
language of Rule 702 for the "probative value" language of Rule 403.
C.

The Reliability Requirement

If a proffer of expert testimony survives a court's analysis of the
qualifications requirement and the assistance requirement, the court
should next determine whether the testimony is reliable. 249 This
involves a four-step process. First, the court should determine if the
proffered testimony is of a scientific or nonscientific nature. Second, the
court should determine if the expert's choice of methodology is
sufficiently reliable, applying different standards for scientific and
nonscientific testimony. Third, the court should examine the execution
of the chosen methodology, looking out for flaws that may undermine
its reliability. Fourth, the court should examine whether the expert's
conclusions reasonably could be inferred from the methodology he
employed. The emphasis here should not be on the substance of the
expert's conclusions, but only on whether the scope of his conclusions
were commensurate with the methodology he employed. 250

245. Id.
246. Id. at 926.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. The portion of this model devoted to the reliability requirement in some
respects resembles a model proposed in a student note in the Georgetown Law Review.
See Kesan, supra note 20, at 2018-23.
250. See id. at 2022.
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I.

Step One: Whether the Testimony is of a
Scientific or Nonscientific Nature

As described supra, Daubert identified testimony as scientific in
nature if the expert claims to have validated his opinions or assertions
by the scientific method. 251 Whether testimony is scientific or nonscientific is especially important if a court has significantly different
admissibility standards for the two classifications of testimony. 252
However, even in the model proposed by this Comment, which has a
reliability requirement for all expert testimony, the classification of
scientific or nonscientific still has implications. Some of the considerations that are helpful in determining the reliability of scientific
testimony are much less helpful with nonscientific testimony. To
understand why, it might be useful to know a few basic principles about
epistemology.
Epistemology, referred to by some as "theory of knowledge," 253 is
the study of human cognition. 254 People are generally aware that they
are knowing and take cognition for granted. 255 Epistemology is the
challenging philosophical discipline of asking what our mind is actually
aware of in cognition. 256 In this sense, cognition is not only the topic
of the inquiry, it is also the examiner. 257
Many of the early philosophers to struggle with epistemological
questions, 258 among them Plato259 and Rene Descartes,260 believed
that some ideas or principles were. innate to mankind. 261 John
Locke, 262 a seventeenth century English philosopher who is commonly
regarded as the founder of empiricism, rejected innate ideas. 263 Locke

251. See supra Part IV.C; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993).
252. See supra Part IV.B.
253. E.g., A.D. WOOZLEY, THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: AN INTRODUCTION 12 (1949).
254. JOSEPH OWENS, COGNITION: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL INQUIRY 4 (1992).
255. See id. at 4-5.
256. WOOZLEY, supra note 253, at 29.
257. OWENS, supra note 254, at 20.
258. The term "epistemology" actually only dates from the mid-nineteenth century.
Id. at 4.
259. Plato was born circa 427 and died 347 B.C. ANTONY FLEW, AN INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN PHILOSOPHY: IDEAS AND ARGUMENT FROM PLATO TO SARTRE 26
(1971).
260. Descartes (1596-1650) is considered by some to be the founder of modem
philosophy. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 557 (1945).
261. See id. at 609.
262. The English philosopher John Locke was born in 1632 and died in 1704. Id.
at 604.
263. Id. at 610.
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believed that all knowledge (with the possible exception of logic and
mathematics) is derived from experience. 264 Although the idea that all
knowledge is derived from experience may not sound that newsworthy
in this day and age, at the time Locke's empiricism was a bold
innovation. 265
Locke's empiricism meshed with the beginning of modem science,
which was under way by the early seventeenth century. 266 Francis
Bacon,267 an English philosopher and scientist, was one of the leaders
of the new scientific movement. 268 Bacon attempted to give direction
to this movement by defining the general methodology of the sciences
and the mode of its application. 269 In his main work, the Great
Inausteration of Learning, Bacon dedicated a portion of the work to an
analysis of the scientific method, or "New Instrument" as he called
it. 270 Like the modern scientific method, Bacon's method involved
framing hypotheses and conducting experiments to test these hypotheses.271
Although influential to later generations of scientists, Bacon's "New
Instrument" did not receive immediate application during his lifetime.272 That step was taken by Sir Isaac Newton, 273 an English
scientist of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, who
believed like Bacon that scientific knowledge was derived by experiment, not intuition. 274 Newton relied on the experimental method to
derive his laws of mechanics, and his reliance on that methodology is
sometimes referred to as "Newtonian science."275
Bacon and Newton's theories on how to derive scientific knowledge
were compatible with Locke's theory that all knowledge was acquired

264. Id. at 609.
265. See id. at 610.
266. MASON, supra note 180, at 140.
267. Bacon was born is 1561 and died in 1626. Id. at 141.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See id. at 140-41.
272. Id. at 146.
273. Newton was born in 1642 and died in 1727. Id. at 198.
274. Id. at 204. According to one author, "[w]hat Bacon had prophesied in the way
of an inductive interpretation of nature, Newton had brought to fruition." LARRY
LAUDAN, SCIENCE AND HYPOTHESIS: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY

86 (1981).
275. Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2276.
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through experience. The three men's theories were distinctively
empirical. Scientific knowledge depended on experiment, while other
bodies of knowledge depended on the more general kind of experiences
that shape everyday life.
In Daubert, Justice Blackmun asked how a scientist conies to know
that a scientific proposition is true, and found the answer in experimental
science. 276 Accordingly, when Blackmun propounded his standard for
the reliability of scientific testimony, he focused on the methods of
experimental science, which involved such considerations as falsifiability
and rate of error. 277 If the Supreme Court were ever faced with a case
in which a party contested the admissibility of nonscientific expert
testimony, the Court might take a similarly epistemological approach as
it did in Daubert. The court would ask how the nonscientific expert
came to know that his opinions were true, and probably find that the
nonscientific expert's opinions were shaped by personal or vicarious
experiences gained through work, hobby, education, or training.
Accordingly, in conceiving a standard of reliability for nonscientific
testimony, the court should focus on the methods in which nonscientists
gain their relevant experiences. This standard should differ from
Daubert's, because issues such as testability and rate of error have little
to no value in analyzing a nonscientific expert's relevant experiences.278
Because the classification of an expert's testimony should affect a
court's analysis of the expert's choice of methodology, the determination
of whether testimony is scientific or nonscientific should be a court's
first step in its reliability analysis. The court should make this
determination with every opinion an expert offers, because some
opinions may be of a scientific nature, while others may not. If an

276. See id. at 2277; Berger, supra note 187, at 82 ("The Daubert opinion views
science as an empirical enterprise and emphasizes the need for validation through
testing.").
277. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2277.
278. Judge Richard Posner has remarked on the difference between how scientific
and nonscientific experts acquire the knowledge informing their opinions. See American
Int'l Adjustment Co. v. Galvin, 86 F.3d 1455, 1465 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.,
dissenting). American International was a legal malpractice case in which the defendant
lawyer offered an expert to rebut the charge of malpractice. Id. at 1461. In his dissent,
Posner argued that Daubert makes clear that it is the responsibility of district courts to
make sure that when scientific and nonscientific experts testify in court, they adhere to
the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their professional work.
Id. at 1465. Posner pointed out, however, that what counts as intellectual rigor will be
different in different fields. Id. He surmised, "A lawyer who is asked to testify about
the standard of care· in trying a personal injury case is not expected to employ the
scientific method, because he doesn't use that method in his ordinary professional work.
But he is expected to defend his conclusion with reasons." Id.
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expert claims that the knowledge underlying a particular opinion was
derived by the scientific method, meaning that the expert formed a
hypothesis and engaged in experimentation or observation to confirm or
falsify the hypothesis, the court should apply Daubert. If the expert
claims that the knowledge underlying a particular opinion was derived
by the more general range of experiences that one acquires through
work, hobby, education, or training, the court should apply this model's
standard for determining the reliability of a nonscientific expert's choice
of methodology.
Courts will encounter cases where the expert's methodology has
certain qualities of, but may not match, paradigmatic application of the
scientific method. 279 In these close-call cases, whether the court
applies this model's standard of reliability for scientific or nonscientific
testimony will not typically affect whether the testimony is admitted. As
will be evident, the nonscientific standard's quantitative and qualitative
analysis is similar enough to the scientific standard's focus on falsifiability and rate. of error that a court should reach the same result.
The bottom line should always be reliability. If a court feels that
some aspects of the Daubert standard and some aspects of the model's
nonscientific standard are both revealing on the question of reliability,
the court should not feel obligated to adhere entirely to one standard
over the other.

279. See MARTIN GOLDSTEIN & INGE F. GOLDSTEIN, How WE KNOW: AN
EXPLORATION OF THE SCIENTIFIC PROCESS 4-5 (1978). The Goldsteins observe:
[M]ost people, in the course of making the various choices and decisions of
daily life-whom to vote for, what to buy, where to live, what to eat-apply
some features of scientific method in an intuitive way. They usually do not
think of what they do as being an application of scientific method, nor do they
use it to the maximum extent.
Id.
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2.

Step Two: Analyzing the Reliability of the
Expert's Choice of Methodology
a.

Scientific Testimony2 80

Daubert is stare decisis for scientific testimony. Thus, when faced
with a proffer of scientific testimony, a district court must ascertain
whether it is "scientific knowledge" under Daubert. 281 Daubert's
essential test for determining whether testimony is scientific knowledge
is "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid." 282 The Court provided four factors which might
bear on this inquiry, including testability, 283 peer review or publication,
rate of error, and general acceptance. 284 Daubert emphasized that the
factors should be exercised flexibly, 285 and courts286 and commentators287 generally agree.
Although Daubert's admissibility test may be most apt for physical or
"hard" sciences, Daubert should also be the standard for social
sciences. 288 All purportedly scientific testimony should be scientifical-

280. There are dozens and dozens of articles on how to analyze a scientific expert's
methodology under Daubert. This Comment touches upon only a few of the most
central ideas.
281. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).
282. Id. at 592-93.
283. Daubert stated that testability was a key question in determining whether a
theory or technique was scientific knowledge. Id. at 593. If an expert claims to have
relied on the scientific method, most often his theory or technique will be testable.
Nevertheless, there may be cases in which an expert claims to have relied on the
scientific method, but in fact did not rely on a demonstrable testing procedure that could
be replicated by others.
284. Id. at 593-94.
285. Id. at 594.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1996). The
defendants in Sherwood, who were convicted of kidnapping and other charges, contended
on appeal that the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Kenneth Dunn, a
fingerprint expert. Id. at 407-08. In its inquiry into whether Dunn's testimony was
scientific knowledge, the court acknowledged that the four Daubert factors may be
relevant. Id. at 408. However, the court stated, "We consider these factors nonexhaustive and recognize that not every factor will be applicable in every case." Id.
The court held that the district court did not commit error in admitting the testimony
because Dunn's technique was generally accepted and had been subject to peer review
and publication. Id.
287. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 23, at 141; Nahas, supra note 65, at 121.
288. Social sciences, sometimes referred to as human or behavioral sciences,
concern themselves with human behavior. ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN, SCIENCE AND
RESPONSIBILITY 51-52 (1970). Perhaps the strongest evidence that the Supreme Court
intended Daubert's standard of admissibility to apply to social sciences is the Court's
remand of a case involving expert testimony on eyewitness identification to be reviewed
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ly valid. It is true that the social sciences do not lend themselves as well
to experimentation and can rarely be quantified by rate of error. 289 For
this reason, when the Daubert factors are unhelpful, courts should
determine the validity of a social scientist's opinions by other indicia.
Some indicia of scientific validity a court might consider are
operationalization of terms; 290 generalization of results 291 over time,
persons, and settings; 292 controlling for compounding factors; 293 and
selection and investigator bias. 294 Other indicia might be whether the
instrumentation used was well accepted in the relevant discipline and
whether there has been adequate replication of the findings. 295
Some expert testimony, particularly that given by engineers, mechanics, and electricians, is founded on some combination of known scientific
principles, the expert's education and experience, and a factual study of
the case. 296 These experts would be likely to testify in a products
liability or accident case, where the product failure or accident cannot be

by the district court in light of Daubert. See United States v. Rincon, 510 U.S. 801
(1993). The Ninth Circuit's subsequent opinion in Rincon is discussed supra note 136.
289. See Unites States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying
Daubert to expert psychological and psychiatric testimony, although commenting that
social sciences have posed both analytical and practical difficulties for courts attempting
to apply Rule 702 and Daubert); United States v. Rouse, 100 F.3d 560, 567-68 (8th Cir.
1996). In Rouse, the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling to exclude the expert
testimony of a psychologist who offered to testify regarding child witnesses of sexual
abuse and their susceptibility to faulty memory. Rouse, 100 F.3d at 567. The court
indicated that Daubert does apply to soft sciences and that such testimony must be
reliable and relevant. Id. Nevertheless, the court pointed out, "Here, we deal with a
social science in which the research, theories and opinions cannot have the exactness of
hard science methodologies such as blood tests, DNA, spectographic evidence or
chemical exposures with which Daubert dealt. . . . Daubert principles may not fully
apply to certain social science evidence." Id. at 567-68.
290. ."Operationalization" refers to the process of defining the variables under study
in a way amenable to measurement. This allows for experiments to be more easily
replicated. Duncan, supra note 173, at 756 n.31.
291. "Selection bias" refers to preexisting differences between samples. Id. at 756
n.34.
292. "Generalization" ·is the method for evaluating how far beyond the specific facts
of a study validly-produced research findings remain valid. Id. at 756 n.32.
293. "Compounding factors" are alternative causes of a phenomenon. Id. at 756
n.33.
294. Id. at 756.
295. Richardson et al., supra note 184, at 15.
296. One commentator has described this species of testimony as "quasi-scientific."
Agrimonti, supra note 13, at 136 n.13.
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duplicated. 297 To the extent that these experts rest their opinions on
scientific theories or techniques, courts should apply Daubert's standard
of reliability. 298 To the extent these experts rest their opinions on the
more general experiences that inform technical or specialized testimony,
the court should apply this model's standard for nonscientific testimony.
Whether expert testimony is being offered by a physicist, a psychologist, or an engineer, the court must perform its gatekeeping role of
ensuring that the choice of methodology rests on scientifically valid
principles. By zeroing in on the epistemological foundation for each
opinion these experts have to offer, the model suggested by this
Comment should do the chore of gauging the opinion's reliability.

b.
i.

Nonscientific Testimony
Initial Screening Procedure

If a district court determines that a proffer of testimony is nonscientific, meaning that the expert's purported knowledge was not acquired
through the scientific method, the court should perform the screening
procedure discussed in Part IV.C of this Comment before undertaking its
reliability analysis. The screening procedure recognizes that Daubert's
conception of science focused on how the expert acquired his knowledge, not on the subject matter involved. Therefore, when the body of
knowledge upon which an expert is testifying concerns the study of
nature, including human and animal behavior, and the expert claims not
to have validated his opinions through the scientific method, courts
should be very skeptical of the evidence. This skepticism should amount
to an inference that the testimony is unreliable. An expert's disregarding
the scientific method to explain a natural phenomenon should not· be a

297. See Coben, supra note 13, at 56 (remarking how certain product failures cannot
be duplicated).
298. See Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1996). Cummins brought
a product liability action against Lyle after three of Cummins's fingers were severed in
a trim press manufactured by Lyle. Id. at 365. The district court excluded the expert
testimony of Dr. Thomas Carpenter, who intended to testify on behalf of plaintiff in
regard to the feasibility of alternative design and the adequacy of the instructions for the
trim press. Id. at 366. On appeal, plaintiff argued that Daubert's standard of
admissibility should not apply, as Carpenter was not testifying on a pure scientific
theory, but rather the application of well-known instruments of the engineering
profession to a particular and not-out-of-the-ordinary application. Id. at 367 n.2. The
Eighth Circuit disagreed, stating that the Daubert analysis should not be abandoned
simply because the issue before the court, although rooted in science, involved
application of science to a concrete and practical problem. Id. The court added that,
in some "as applied" situations, some of the Daubert factors are worthy of less emphasis
than in situations involving a more abstract or novel scientific theory. Id.
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free ticket to avoid Daubert's emphasis on evidentiary reliability. The
initial screening procedure should serve as a filter through which a court
attaches to such testimony an inference that it is unreliable.

ii.

The Essential Test

Under Daubert, the essential test for determining the reliability of
scientific testimony is whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid. 299 The essential test for determining the reliability of nonscientific testimony should simply be whether
the expert's reasoning or methodology is trustworthy. By this test,
evidentiary reliability is accorded its usual connotation in evidence
law. 300
To frame objective standards for determining trustworthiness, one
should take into account how nonscientific experts come to acquire the
knowledge which underlies their opinions. How do experts on airline
security, candy making, crime insurance, snake handling, and estate
planning gain their expertise? Unlike scientific experts, whose relevant
experiences are generally acquired through execution of the scientific
method and the inferences made during its course, the nonscientific
expert's relevant experiences are generally acquired through education,
training, employment, and pursuance of a hobby, as well as the
inferences made during the course of each. 301 Of the four reliability
factors for nonscientific testimony proposed in this model, the first two
mentioned below give special consideration to how nonscientific
knowledge is obtained. As with the Daubert factors, the nonscientific
factors should be applied in a flexible manner.

299. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 n.9, 592-93
(1993).
300. See id. at 591-92 n.9 (equating evidentiary reliability with trustworthiness);
FED. R. EVID. Article VIII advisory committee introductory note (discussing the general
common law rule excluding hearsay and the rule's numerous exceptions "under
circumstances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness").
301. With both scientific and nonscientific experts, the relevant experiences may
have been acquired either personally or vicariously. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13,
at 2289-90 ("[J]ust as a scientist can gain vicarious experience by speaking with other
scientists and reading written descriptions of their experiments, nonscientific witnesses
sometimes rely on vicarious as well as personal experience.").
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iii.

The Four Factors

The first factor a court should consider in determining the reliability
of a nonscientific expert's opinion is whether the experiences underlying
the opinion are of sufficient quantity to render the opinion trustworthy.
Several subfactors will bear on this inquiry. The second factor a court
should consider is whether the experiences underlying the opinion are of
sufficient quality to rende_r the opinion trustworthy. Several subfactors
will bear on this inquiry as ·well._302 The third and fourth factors are
Daubert factors which have been slightly reformulated to fit into the
context of nonscientific testimony. They are whether the expert's
theories or techniques have been subjected to peer review and publication, and whether the theories or techniques are generally accepted in the
relevant community.
a.

Quantitative Analysis

One factor a court might consider in analyzing the trustworthiness of
a nonscientific expert's opinion is the sheer number of experiences upon
which the expert claims to have based his opinions. 303 So, for a
nonscientific expert whose opinion on a fact in issue is derived in part
on his educational background, a court might consider how many years
of education on the subject the expert received. 304 For a nonscientific
expert whose opinion on a fact in issue is derived in part from her work
background, a court might consider how long the expert has worked in
the relevant field, as well as the number of instances in which the expert
confronted the precise type of issue at hand.
Consider, for instance, a banker offering to testify on the subject of
lender liability. In judging the reliability of the banker's opinions, the
court should consider the quantity of courses and time the expert spent

302. See id. at 2290-94. In his epistemological analysis of a nonscientific expert's
opinions, Imwinkelried explored what impact the quantity and quality of the expert's
experiences has on the reliability of the expert's opinions. Id. Imwinkelried was led to
this focus in part by the work of David Hume, an eighteenth century philosopher. Id.
Although this model borrows some of Imwinkelried's ideas on the quantity and quality
of experiences, the model does not attempt to further tie those ideas to Hume. Hume's
rejection of induction and his belief that nothing.is to be learned from experiment and
observation make it conceptually difficult to use his philosophy as a tool to analyze the
reliability of an expert's proffered knowledge. See generally RUSSELL, supra note 260,
at 672-73 (discussing Hume's skepticism).
303. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2290-91.
304. As discussed supra Part V.A, a court's analysis of the reliability of a
nonscientific expert's opinions will often overlap with its analysis of the nonscientific
expert's qualifications.
·
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during her education dedicated to the subject of lender liability. The
court should also consider the quantity of time the expert spent in the
banking industry, as well as the quantity of specific instances in which
the expert dealt with issues relating to lender liability.
As it performs its quantitative analysis, a court should pay close
attention to (1) the expert's inclination towards superlatives, (2) the size
of the relevant universe in which the expert is basing his opinions, 305
and (3) the elasticity of the learning curve on the subject of the
testimony. These three considerations are fairly routine, and a court
should expand its quantitative analysis to include other considerations
when appropriate.
If an expert is offering her opinions in the form of, or close to,
superlatives, a court should expect a greater quantity of experiences than
if the expert were speaking in generalities. For example, suppose that
one expert in auto sales offered to testify that it would be "uncommon"
for a used car dealer to sell a used car without first giving the car a
smog test. Suppose that a second expert in auto sales offered to testify
that car dealers would "never" sell a used car without first giving it a
smog test. For a court to feel assured of the reliability of such a strong
statement by the second expert, the court would be justified in demanding from the second expert a greater quantity of experiences in the used
car business than the court would demand from the first expert. To
know that the practice of selling unsmogged cars "never" occurred, the
second expert would need to have spoken to many used car dealers or
have other substantial experience.
A court's quantitative analysis should also be informed by the size of
the relevant universe in which the expert is basing her opinions. The
greater the universe, the more a court would expect of the expert in
terms of quantity of experiences. For example, suppose that one auto
sales expert offered to testify that no major car dealership in San Diego
would ever sell an unsmogged car. The second auto sales expert offered
to testify that no used car dealer, anywhere from San Diego to Sarasota,
would ever sell an unsmogged car. For a court to feel assured of the
trustworthiness of the second expert's opinion, the court might demand
a greater quantity of experiences than the court demands of the first.
The size of the relevant universe is greater in the case of the second
305. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2291 (referring to "the tenor of the
testimony and the size of the relevant universe").
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expert, and the quantity of her experiences should reflect that increase
to maintain trustworthiness.
The third factor a court may weigh into its quantitative analysis is the
elasticity of the learning curve on the subject of the testimony. The
easier a body of nonscientific knowledge is to learn, the fewer experiences a court would require to feel assured of the reliability of an expert's
opinions. 306 For example, consider an expert on horses who first
intends to testify as to the proper manner of changing a horse's shoes.
The expert next intends to testify on the practice and techniques of
breeding thoroughbreds. Both pieces of testimony are beyond the ken
of the average lay juror in a Manhattan courtroom, but surely it took
fewer experiences for the expert to gain the knowledge necessary to
testify reliably on the first matter. The first matter is less complex, and
the learning curve would be more elastic. A court might admit the
expert's testimony on the first matter if he had seen a horse's shoe
changed on a dozen occasions, but might not admit the testimony on the
second matter if the expert only had experience with a dozen horses
being bred.
b.

Qualitative Analysis

With a scientific opinion, courts can judge the quality of an expert's
experiences by considering such factors as rate of error and the
maintenance of standards controlling a technique's operation. With a
nonscientific opinion, courts can judge the quality of an expert's
experiences by considering (1) the consistency of the experiences that
inform his opinion, 307 (2) the similarity of the experiences that inform
his opinion, 308 (3) whether the experiences were personal in nature or
vicarious, and (4) how recent the experiences were.
Consistency plays a similar role with regard to nonscientific testimony
as rate of error does with scientific testimony. With nonscientific
testimony, an expert's knowledge is informed by personal or vicarious
experiences, and based on patterns of consistency he is able to draw
links between cause and effect. The more consistently an expert

306. Of course the intelligence of the expert may be just as important as the
simplicity or difficulty of the subject of the testimony. One can assume a trial judge will
take into account an expert's apparent mental acumen without a model to suggest that
he do so.
307. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2292-93 (mentioning this consideration).
308. See id. (mentioning this consideration).
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observes that a certain cause leads to a certain effect, the more justified
the expert is in forming an opinion on causation. 309
The similarity of experiences upon which a nonscientific expert's
opinion is based should also inform the court of the opinion's trustworthiness. The more similar a nonscientific expert's experiences are to the
fact in issue, the more reliable a basis the expert has to form an
opinion. 31° For example, consider a maritime expert who offered to
testify that a captain's decision to sail his vessel into the face of a severe
blizzard fell below the standard of care. The expert had no experience
on the effects blizzards can have on a vessel's seaworthiness. However,
he had studied at great length and in some cases personally observed the
effects hurricanes, monsoons, and other natural occurrences have on a
vessel's seaworthiness. A court might find that the expert's experiences
were too dissimilar to a vessel's setting sail into a blizzard for him to
form a reliable opinion on the matter. Other courts might disagree,
finding that the expert's general experience on the effect weather can
have on a vessel's seaworthiness provides him with sufficient knowledge
to provide a reliable opinion in this case.
A court might also judge the quality of a nonscientific expert's
experiences by determining whether the expert had acquired those
experiences firsthand or vicariously. Firsthand experiences may often be
more reliable than those obtained vicariously. Experiences of another
that are shared with an expert and then incorporated into the expert's
body of knowledge suffer from the same risks that courts face with
hearsay. 311 The person who shares the experiences can be likened to
the declarant in a hearsay situation. The experiences the declarant shares
suffer from the risk of ambiguity, in that the declarant may not be clear
in what he had experienced, and the risk of candor, in that the declarant
may be lying. The experiences the declarant shares also suffer from the

309. See Vadala v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 44 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Certainly
the fact that there is a pattern of occurrences, reflecting an apparent cause and effect
sequence, can strengthen the likelihood that the present case is one more in the pattern.
This is how human beings reason about circumstantial evidence.").
310. See id. After discussing how consistency of experiences strengthens an
inference, the Vadala court added, "But the strength of the inference depends very much
on further facts, for example, the comparative frequency of the pattern [a quantitative
analysis] and the tightness of the match [an inquiry into similarity of experiences]
between the perceived pattern and the present accident." Id. (emphasis added).
311. See generally ARTHUR BEST, EVIDENCE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 60-62
(1994) (describing the "testimonial infirmities" of hearsay).
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risk of failed memory, in that the declarant may have forgotten what he
had experienced, and the risk of misperception, in that the declarant may
have simply misperceived the experience. Therefore, if an expert's
knowledge on a subject is largely dependent upon the experiences of
others, a court might be more skeptical of the reliability of his opinions
than if the knowledge were acquired firsthand. 312
A fourth consideration bearing on the quality of a nonscientific
expert's experiences is how recently the experiences occurred. Unlike
the study of the natural world, which lends itself to timeless scientific
laws, 313 the subject matter that comprises nonscientific testimony is
usually evolving. The standard of care for a tax attorney may not be the
same today as it was a generation ago. Drug traffickers are more
sophisticated than in the past. The wig industry may have suffered with
the advent of hair implants. In some fields, it is clear that an expert's
experiences must be fresh to be trustworthy.
A further justification for inquiring into how recently a nonscientific
expert acquired his experiences is the fact that memories fade.
Moreover, unlike scientists who typically record the results of their
research in some systematic fashion, nonscientific experts are generally
more relaxed in their efforts to record the experiences underlying their
opinions. 314 Accordingly, courts should be wary of nonscientific
experts whose relevant experiences were acquired some time ago and
were not recorded in a timely and systematic manner.

c.

Peer Review and Publication

The second Daubert factor-whether a theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication315 -may be pertinent in
determining the trustworthiness of some proffers of nonscientific expert
testimony. This factor might be reformulated for nonscientific testimony
as: "whether the experiential bases that inform an expert's opinion have
been subjected to peer review and publication." Naturally, this would
include both personal and vicarious experiences. However, if an expert's
experiences had been peer reviewed, more often they would be vicarious
312. If a court determines that an expert's experience was obtained vicariously, the
court should still do more to inquire into the quality of the experience. An experience
shared between experts may be more reliable than an experience shared between a
layman and an expert. An experience that an expert acquired from a reputable book
would obviously be more reliable than an experience acquired from a newsstand tabloid .
313. See RUTHERFORD & AHLGREN, supra note 170, at 4. According to Rutherford
and Ahlgren, "[a]lthough scientists reject the notion of attaining absolute truth and accept
some uncertainty as part of nature, most scientific knowledge is durable." Id.
314. See Imwinkelried, supra note 13, at 2290 (observing same).
315. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
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in that the expert had consulted some publication or utilized some wellknown methodology. Less often would an expert have received peer
review of his personal experiences.
To illustrate how this reformulated second Daubert factor might work,
consider an expert in rare coins who intends to testify as to the value of
a collection of eighteenth century American coins. In appraising each
coin, the expert relied primarily on a tradebook published by a small
Canadian press. The tradebook assigns values to coins based on quality
ratings. In his motion in limine to exclude this expert testimony, the
opponent directed the court to two other tradebooks. These two
tradebooks have over ten times the circulation of the expert's tradebook
and were published by America's two largest rare coins trade associations. These two tradebooks thoroughly discredit the small Canadian
press used by the expert, and would value the coin collection at double
the expert's figure. In this circumstance, a court might determine that
the primary experience upon which the expert based his opinions had
been subjected to peer review and shown to be flawed.

d.

General Acceptance

After the rare coins hypothetical above, it would not be a great leap
to see how general acceptance might assist a court in determining the
reliability of a nonscientific expert's opinion. For instance, in FrymireBrinati v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 316 a pair of investors brought suit
against Peat Marwick for securities fraud. 317 Peat Marwick had
audited and certified financial statements on which the investors claimed
to have relied in making their investments. 318 William Hassett, the
plaintiff's star expert witness and the manager of a Chicago accounting
firm, testified at trial that in conducting the audit of the relevant
financial statements, Peat Marwick did not state its accounts according
to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 319 Hassett's opinions
rested in large part on his use of a controversial discounted cash flow

316.
317.
318.
319.

2 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1993) (also discussed supra note 83).
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 186.
Id.
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analysis. 320 He admitted that his valuations were imprecise and only
'"a fairly simple pass at what the magnitude of the problem was."' 321
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court could not properly have
admitted the testimony under Rule 702. 322 According to the Seventh
Circuit, a trial judge must ensure that all expert testimony is reliable. 323
The court further stated, "Admitting Hassett's 'fairly simple pass' into
evidence just because he is an expert in accounting is problematic, for
Hassett conceded that he did not employ the methodology that experts
in valuation find essential."324 Evidently, the fact that Hassett's
methodology was not generally accepted in the accounting community
was important to the Seventh Circuit's reliability analysis.
3.

Step Three: Analyzing the Execution of the Chosen
Methodology in the Particular Case

Even if an expert's chosen methodology is reliable in the abstract, the
expert's opinions may nevertheless be unreliable if the actual execution
of the methodology in the case at hand was substantially flawed. The
question a court must consider is whether the improper execution of a
reliable methodology should go to the weight of the testimony or should
be a basis upon which to exclude the testimony. If a court concludes
that improper execution is a basis upon which to exclude the testimony,
how "improper" must it be to warrant exclusion?
Some courts view improper execution only as a matter going to the
weight of the evidence. For instance, in United States v. Chischilly, 325
the defendant was convicted of raping and murdering a woman. 326 At
trial, the district court had admitted evidence of a match between a blood
sample taken from the defendant and semen found on the victim's
clothing, as well as testimony regarding the random probability of such
a match. 327 On appeal, one of the defendant's specific objections
regarded the possible degrading of the DNA samples. 328 The Ninth
Circuit noted that this objection was more troubling than the defendant's
others, insofar as it was based on data specific to the defendant's· DNA
test and was not rebutted with especial force by the experts retained by

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
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30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1146-47.
Id. at 1152.
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the government. 329 Nevertheless, the court found that the defendant
failed to demonstrate that the degradation was a result of a faulty
methodology as opposed to imperfect execution of laboratory techniques
whose theoretical foundation was sufficiently accepted in the scientific
community to pass muster under Daubert. 330 The court concluded,
"The impact of imperfectly conducted laboratory procedures might
therefore be approached more properly as an issue going not to the
admissibility, but to the weight of the DNA profiling evidence."331
The better approach, which this model adopts, is to have improper
execution go to either admissibility or weight depending on the severity
of the flaws. According to the Eighth Circuit, Daubert's requirement
that a trial judge ensure that all scientific testimony is reliable suggests
that the judge's gatekeeping role extends beyond the reliability of the
principles or methodologies in the abstract. 332 In order to determine
whether scientific testimony is reliable, the judge must conclude that the
testimony was derived from the application of a reliable methodology or
principle in the particular case. 333 However, the court continued, not
every error in application warrants exclusion. 334 Under Daubert's
flexible standard, "[a]n alleged error in the application of a reliable
methodology should provide the basis for exclusion of the opinion only
if that error negates the basis for the reliability of the principle
itself." 335
The key word in this standard is "negates." Presumably under
Martinez, if an error only diminishes the basis for the reliability of the
principle itself, the opinion would be admitted. This appears to be a fair
compromise on the weight/admissibility distinction. If a reliable
methodology _was so improperly executed that the basis for the reliability
of the principle has been negated, such testimony would be no more
helpful to a jury than if the methodology itself were flawed.

329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1198 (8th Cir. 1993).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.; see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 858 (3rd Cir.
1990) (finding that an allegation of failure to apply a scientific principle properly should
support exclusion of an expert opinion only if "a reliable methodology was so altered
[by a particular expert] as to skew the methodology itself').
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A court's inquiry into the execution of an expert's methodology ih a
particular case will probably have more application with scientific
testimony than with nonscientific testimony. By its nature, scientific
testimony involves repeating techniques and experiments. Still, a court
should not overlook that nonscientific experts may improperly perform
methodologies that are critical to their opinions. An example of this is
an expert accountant whose auditing technique is generally accepted, but
whose calculations in a particular case suffer from error. Another
example is a market research expert who, in a particular case, improperly
executes a reliable methodology by carelessly omitting to control for a
compounding factor. In these situations, it would be insufficient for a
judge to limit his reliability analysis to the nonscientific expert's
methodologies in the abstract.
4.

Step Four: Comparing the Expert's Conclusions to the
Scope of his Methodology

Daubert stated that the focus of Rule 702's inquiry must be on
principles and methodologies, not on the conclusions that they generate. 336 Nevertheless, there are two situations in which an expert's
conclusions could be excluded under Daubert on the basis of reliability.337 The first and more obvious situation is when the expert's
conclusions rest on a methodology that failed the Daubert test. The
more subtle situation is when an expert's conclusions are not commensurate with his underlying methodology, and thus cannot satisfy Daubert's
standard of "knowledge." In such cases, the expert's conclusions could
not reasonably be inferred from the methodology he employed. If the
inference was unreasonable, then the conclusion will not rest on good
grounds. Typically in these cases in which an expert exceeds the scope
of his methodology, a court will find that there is some overlap between
its reliability and "fit" analysis.
An example of a court finding that an expert's conclusions were not
commensurate with his methodology is Grimes v. Hoffman-LaRoche. 338
Grimes sued Hoffman-LaRoche and her doctor, Pierre G. Labrecque,
after developing cataracts which she claimed were caused by Accutane,
a prescription drug manufactured by Hoffman-LaRoche. 339 Grimes
attempted to prove causation with the opinion testimony of Dr. Sidney
Lerman, an ophthalmologist with a recognized expertise in evaluating

336.
337.
338.
339.
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photochemical effects on the eye. 340
Lerinan's testimony that
Accutane played a role in the development of Grimes's cataracts rested
on what Lerman described as a generally accepted scientific fact that
photosensitive chemicals341 that enter the lens and become photobound
to lens protein will produce cataracts. 342 Nevertheless, Lerman failed
to identify any authoritative source which recognized this as a generally
accepted fact. 343 The court noted that even if this were a fact, Lerman
had failed to identify any scientifically reliable basis for concluding that
Accutane causes cataracts simply because other photosensitive drugs
cause cataracts. 344 Finally, even if it could reliably be claimed that all
photosensitive chemicals that become photobound to lens protein will
produce cataracts if they are present in certain concentrations, that claim
would be irrelevant unless one could conclude Grimes had taken a
sufficient dosage. 345
The court excluded the testimony, stating that even if it was to assume
that Lerman's methodology was sound, his opinion was based "on an
untested assumption which fails Daubert' s reliability and fit requirements. "346 The court's problem was not with Lerman's methodologies,
only his conclusions. Because Lerman's conclusions exceeded the scope
of his methodology, the court excluded the testimony on the grounds of
reliability and fit.
VI.

CONCLUSION

When people hear the words "expert witness," it is not unusual for
some to roll their eyes and smirk. If they take. a more humorless view,
perhaps they will mutter a few expletives. These reactions do not stem
from any feeling that experts have no place in the courtroom. Instead,
the reactions stem from a feeling that experts are simply hired guns
whose opinions are adaptable to the wishes of the highest bidder..
Daubert took a stride to ameliorate the reputation of opinion evidence
by requiring that all scientific testimony be reliable and relevant.

340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.

Id.
Accutane is a photosensitive drug. Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Quite clearly, however, Daubert left open the standard for the
admissibility of nonscientific testimony. Some lower courts have seized
upon this opening and fashioned their own standard, which often differs
significantly from Daubert's. Because the admissibility of a proffer of
expert testimony may depend on what standard a court applies, courts
should develop some consistent means by which to differentiate the
scientific from the nonscientific. Courts which do not apply Daubert to
nonscientific testimony should always explicitly classify the nature of the
testimony with which they are faced. Such a practice would help defuse
any confusion as to why the court applied one standard of admissibility
over another.
The model proposed in this Comment is for courts to use in their
admissibility analysis under Rule 702, the primary rule guiding a trial
judge's gatekeeping function. The model incorporates the important
policy that all testimony be reliable, and also recognizes that the criteria
upon which a court determines reliability should vary with the
testimony's nature. With testimony of a nonscientific nature, the
expert's experiential foundation is typically acquired through employment, hobby, education, or training, not through application of the
scientific method. Factors bearing on reliability should account for this
distinction.
Expert testimony comes in many forms, and the model is not designed
to be applied rigidly. One function the model should serve is to provide
structure to a trial judge's admissibility analysis. Most appellate courts
review Rule 702 rulings under an abuse of discretion or some similarly
deferential standard, 347 and as a consequence the clarity of a district
court's admissibility analysis may be an important aspect as to whether
the district court's rulings will be upheld. The more vague and
unstructured a district court's analysis, the more difficulty a circuit court
will have in articulating how the district court had abused its discretion.
By the same token, the more crisp and structured a district court's
analysis, the easier a circuit court's job. Circuit courts may be tentative
in reversing a district court ruling unless they can articulate their

347. Fenner, supra note 15, at 1028; Cook v. American S.S. Co., 53 F.3d 733, 738
(6th Cir. 1995) ("Many opinions from this and other circuits have declared that a district
court's decision to admit expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."); see
also United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1183 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that the law
affords trial judges "substantial discretion" in connection with the admission or exclusion
of opinion evidence, and that a trial judge's ruling in this sphere should be upheld unless
"manifestly erroneous"); United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 58 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating
that a decision to allow expert testimony is within the broad discretion of the trial judge
and is to be sustained on appeal unless "manifestly erroneous"); Hopkins v. Dow
Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 1994) (reviewing for abuse of discretion).
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rationale in a convincing manner. Over time, district courts adhering to
a model such as this one will put circuit courts in a better position to
maintain consistency in the realm of expert testimony admissibility
rulings.
EDSON MCCLELLAN
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A MODEL FOR COURTS TO USE IN PERFORMING
THEIR ADMISSIBILITY ANALYSIS UNDER RULE 702

PROFFER
OF
EXPERT
TESTIMONY

QUALIFICATIONS
REQUIREMENT

➔

RELIABILITY
REQUIREMENT
Q. Is the testimony

ASSISTANCE
REQUIREMENT

Q. Does the expert have
minimal educational and
experimental qualifications
in the general field upon
which he proposes to
testify? If so, does the
expert have sufficient
educational and experimental qualifications
with regard to each
controverted issue upon
which he intends to
testify?

➔

RELEVANCE

Q. Is the testimony
sufficiently tied to
the facts of the case
that it will aid the
jury in resolving a
factual dispute?

➔

t

reliable? (See fourstep inquiry)

t
HELPFULNESS
Q. Would the untrained layman

be qualified to determine
intelligently and to the best
possible degree the particular
issue without enlightenment from
those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved
in the dispute?

00

00

THE FOUR-STEP RELIABILITY INQUIRY
'sl

f:)_,"4

WHETHER THE
TESTIMONY IS
SCIENTIFIC OR
NONSCIENTIFIC
Q. Does the expert
purport to validate his
testimony through the
scientific method, i.e.,
Does the expert
purport to have
gained the knowledge
underlying his
opinions through a
methodology of
forming hypotheses
and then engaging in
experimentation or
observation to conjinn
or falsify the
hypotheses? If yes,
the testimony is
scientific. If not, the
testimony is
nonscientific.

f::'

➔

SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY -

Q. Is the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony scientifically valid?

ESSENTIAL TEST:

FACTORS:

TESTABIIJTY

RATE OF

PEER

GENERAL

ERROR

REVIEW AND

ACCEPTANCE

PUBLIC
TION

NONSCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY -

➔

SCREENING PROCEDURE: If the body of knowledge upon

which the expert is testifying concerns the study of nature,
including human (and other animal) behavior, attach to the
testimony an inference that it is tmreliable.
ESSENTIAL TEST: Q. Is the reasoning or methodology
underlying the testimony trustworthy?

QUANTITATIVE

Q. Does the sheer
number of
experiences upon
which the expert
claims to
based his
tend to establish
his
are trustworthy?

PEER
REVIEW

Q.

the
quality of the

AND

TION

experiences
to
establish that
his opinions
trustworthy?

I ACCEPTANCE

EXECUTION OF
THE CHOSEN
METHODOLOGYQ. Has an error
the execution of the
expert's methodology
in this particular case
negated the basis for
the reliability of the
principle itself?

COMPARING
THE EXPERT'S
CONCLUSIONS
TO THE SCOPE
OF HIS
METHODOWGYQ. Were the expert's
conclusions
commensurate with
the scope of
methodology?
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